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The Western Sahara conflict is one of the most prolonged ones of our time. Finding a resolution to the 
frozen conflict, which made the news headlines close to 50 years ago, has recently gotten new hope 
with the ongoing United Nations led peace talks. The Special Envoy for Western Sahara, the former 
President of Germany, Horst Köhler, has met with all the conflict parties several times and opened the 
table for a potential new peace agreement in the December of 2018.  
 
Similar to other prolonged tragedies of the humankind, the Western Sahara conflict has as many 
different storytellers as there are people speaking about the conflict. The situation, which is often being 
framed as a power rivalry between Algeria and Morocco, two neighboring regional powers in North 
Africa, proves itself to be another story from the perspective of the so-called Polisario Front “refugee 
citizens”, the Sahrawis. The Sahrawis, an indigenous nation of the former Spain governed area of the 
Western Sahara, was given a promise from the UN in 1991 about a referendum, where they would have 
a say in the destiny of their own land and the independence of the nation.  
 
Unfortunately, the UN was not able to keep that promise. Questions of who are the “real Sahrawis” 
and who has the right to vote in the referendum became bigger issues than that of the rights of the 
Sahrawis to decide about their independence. Understandably, the false promises from the international 
community caused frustration, feelings of defeat and even anger among the Sahrawis. Shared 
memories, history and traumas of the refugees in the Algerian desert, that are difficult, even impossible, 
to forget. With a history of prolonged conflict and a profound sense of displacement as an indigenous 
nation, fundamental questions of identity, independence and views on the future prospects of the 
Sahrawis seem to be all overcast with sentiments of not having their rights respected or story listened. 
 
This multilayered situation was the framework of the close to existential research puzzle: How has 
the Sahrawi “refugee nation” survived all these years and how do they recreate themselves via different 
story forms? The aim of this research was to examine different views and to develop an understanding 
of the conceptualization of the self-understanding of the Sahrawis – at least the part of it, which is 
presented to the international audience outside from the community. All in all, in order to formulate some 
kind of picture of the narrations of the identity understanding and the distant nation-building processes 
of the Sahrawis, the research material was collected using a combination of several methods. The 
research material in use included Sahrawi activist interviews in article forms, spoken interviews in 
documentaries and news and one face to face interview with the Polisario Front official representative 
in Finland.  
 
Narrative analysis as the methodological choice and the versatile material basis of the research 
made it possible to elaborate different fractions of the self-understanding of the Sahrawi “citizens”, who 
have already declared to have their own state, the Sahrawi Arabic Democratic Republic of the Western 
Sahara. Different fractions of the narrations form a totality, which is in here named as the “story of the 
nation”. The theoretical framework of the research combined elements of nationalism, state – and 
nation-building research. 
 
The results showed many shades and colors in the self-formed “story of the Sahrawi nation”, 
depending on the viewpoint of the storyteller. In the basis of this research, it is safe to state that from 
the Sahrawi point of view the conflict is not about regional power rivalry. Moreover, it is about the rights 
and the self-determination of a nation wish-to-be, whose one way of existing is to get their story told and 
heard. This piece of work added to the contribution to peak behind the curtains of silence about the 
conflict and to elaborate on, what is going on in the region and why, after all these years, there is no 
endpoint for the conflict close in sight. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One crucial reason why you are reading this research on the Western Sahara conflict and 
the Sahrawi nationalism is that many are not; there is a great lack of general attention and 
awareness of these subjects, especially in western media. To have the status of one of the 
most prolonged, unresolved conflicts of our time, not far from the border of the European 
Union, with this significantly little attention worldwide is surprising and even slightly 
shocking. Why is it so that very few of us, even in the field of Peace and Conflict Research 
know about the conflict, when it has all the signs a conflict usually needs in order to be 
heard and seen in international media and among the researchers in the field: geopolitical 
and economic interests mixed with regional power rivalry, unclear borders between two 
countries and the despair and exile of an indigenous Sahrawi people, which has continued 
dozens of years.  
 
Even though the overall numbers of the Sahrawis living in exile are debatable1, to state 
that over 100 000 Sahrawis live currently in the refugee camps of the Algerian desert, 
near a city called Tindouf is a rather safe estimate. Despite this, the conflict rarely makes 
the news today. In Finland, for example, only the politically left-oriented news agencies, 
organizations working for global solidarity and the most “radical” anti-war peace 
organizations give voice to the situation of the Sahrawis2.  
 
The start of my own research path on the journey of the Western Sahara conflict was 
originally no different when it comes to the state of awareness about the status of the 
Sahrawi nation – or rather, the lack of it. As a starting researcher on the Peace and Conflict 
Research field and as an active member of both national and international societies, I had 
read something about the conflict, of course. My earliest memories of the conflict date 
back to 2016, when I saw pictures of people who had colored the tips of their forefingers 
dark blue on Facebook. They did this to show solidarity with the Sahrawis, while 
                                                 
1 Due to the nomadic lifestyle of some of the Sahrawi refugees, the exact number of the Sahrawis in the camps is 
hard to discover. Even the UNCHR and the WFP estimations have varied widely in different documents from 
90 000 up to 165 000. 
2 For example the Finnish Peace Committee, Maailma.net and the International Solidarity Work follow the 
Western Sahara conflict in the long term and report about it regularly. 
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simultaneously demanding self-determination through a referendum. One of my activist 
friends participated in the 'Blue Finger' campaign, if I recall correctly.3 However, news of 
the campaign was quickly submerged in the feed of other news, other campaigns and 
other events. 
 
In the autumn of 2017, I was working in the Embassy of Finland in Rabat, Morocco. Even 
before my internship at the Embassy in Rabat, I knew I wanted to write my master’s thesis 
from a conflict I somehow knew. “Conflict shopping” for a topic without any deeper 
knowledge of the conflict, choosing one of the many ongoing tragedies on the world map 
without any connection to it whatsoever, would have felt both shallow and unjustified. 
What right would I have, as a western researcher to claim I have knowledge of something 
I had only read from books, images and articles produced by others, while living safely at 
a distance of 5 357 kilometers4 from the people most affected by the conflict? How would 
have I been able to divide the cultural from the historical, individual identity from the 
collective one or the economic interests from the nationalist ethos if I had never set my 
foot in that particular area of the world? To me the answer was clear and simple: I could 
not. 
 
The original plan was to collect research material while I was working in Morocco or stay 
in the country after finishing the internship to conduct interviews. However, I was advised 
from several directions not to do research on the Western Sahara conflict while I would 
be still physically in Morocco, if I wanted to stay in the country for the entire planned six 
months and not to endanger any diplomatic relations between Morocco and Finland. 
Therefore, I needed to think of a different approach. Both in Finland and in Morocco, I had 
heard of a saying that there are three red flags in Morocco you should not question: 1) The 
power of the king Mohammed VI and his institutional authority; 2) Islam and the religious 
norms as the moral and cultural basis of the Moroccan society and last but not least; 3) 
The legal status of the Western Sahara to be something else than owned and ruled by the 
Kingdom of Morocco. 
                                                 
3 Pictures from around the world in the social media can be found with using hashtags #referendumnow 
#westernsahara. 
4 The distance between Tindouf, Algeria and Tampere, Finland on foot according to Google Maps (“Use caution 
– walking directions may not always reflect real-world conditions”). By car the travelling distance would be 
6 008 kilometers, which would take 71 hours without a traffic. 
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According to the Moroccan side of the story, the Western Sahara region is part of Morocco 
historically, culturally and economically - without any question about something else. For 
the Kingdom of Morocco, the current status of the conflict clearly serves its interests, as it 
can freely use the phosphate resources of the region, build solar panels as a national 
investment for renewable energy and sell fish from the Western Sahara coastline without 
strong international objections. The European Union signed a free trade agreement with 
Morocco already in 2012, which the European Court of Justice later ruled to should not 
include products which are produced, fished or found in the area of Western Sahara.5 The 
point of argumentation is clear and easy to accept: The trade agreement cannot be 
implemented in Western Sahara, because it falls outside of the international borders of 
Morocco.6  
 
However, despite the ruling of the European Court of Justice in 2016, the EU has continued 
to trade with Morocco without putting any significant pressure in solving the situation of 
Western Sahara once and for all. Indeed, there seems to be fears that the European Union 
does not genuinely support the peace process by continuing to work with Morocco as if it 
is business as usual.  Erik Hagen, the Executive Director of the Western Sahara Resource 
Watch (WSRW), a watchdog organization scrutinizing the actions of international 
companies in the region, has thus commented on the position of the European Union in 
the conflict: “As long as Morocco is scoring political points and can attract the EU in 
dealing with EU products, it’s useless to conduct peace talks with Morocco”. 7  
 
Nevertheless, at the end of 2018, the United Nations brokered peace talks started again. 
The ongoing peace talks are directed by the former German president Horst Köhler, the 
Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Western Sahara. Two days roundtable 
discussions in Geneva where told to have ended on a positive note, with the next talks 
planned for the first quarter of 2019. Delegations from Morocco, the Polisario Front, 
Algeria and Mauritania where present, which means that all the conflict parties have had 
their say in the beginning of the new round of peace negotiations. According to the United 
                                                 
5 The Court of Justice of the European Union (2016). 
6 Ibid. 
7 Bagnetto (2018). 
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Nations Security Council, the goal of the process is to find "a just, lasting and mutually 
acceptable solution that will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western 
Sahara.”8 
 
What follows from all this is the conclusion that the Western Sahara conflict is as current 
as it is important in the field of Peace and Conflict Research. However, most of the 
knowledge about the conflict is far from up to date. Most of the in-depth research 
literature is published as far as in the 1970’s and 80’s when the war was on the news radar 
of the whole world. Because the conflict is stagnated by nature and no significant 
outbursts of anger in the form of  a direct violence have happened in many years, the 
situation is barely news-worthy. Peaceful resistance of the people is more silent and easily 
close to being invisible in the media compared to direct violence – despite it being 
practiced by hundreds of thousands of Sahrawis around the world from the refugee camps 
of Algeria to the Moroccan controlled area of Western Sahara. Even though the diaspora 
of the Sahrawis is presumably active, it is very hard to get trustworthy proof from that: 
most of the Sahrawi refugees abroad are falsely categorized as either Moroccans, 
Algerians or Spanish, since the status of the Sahrawi Arabic Democratic Republic is only 
partly recognized by the international law terms.  
 
In order to provide a fresher view on the stagnated conflict situation from the viewpoint 
of the Sahrawis, versatile material as the basis of the research was used. Dozens of 
interview articles, documentaries, video interviews and shorter publications where 
scrutinized and from them 10 material sources where chosen. These combined the views 
and aspirations of tens of Sahrawi activists, civil society representatives, Polisario soldiers 
and normal refugee citizens in the side of Algeria about themselves, about the Sahrawi 
nation and the history and future of the people that someday wish to live in a country 
called the Sahrawi Arabic Democratic Republic (SADR) of the Western Sahara. In addition, 
I conducted one-hour long interview myself with Menna Lehbib, the official Polisario 
Front information office representative in February 2019 in Helsinki. The aim was to 
obtain a wide view of the different fractions of the “story of the nation”, narrations that 
the Sahrawis present to the outside audience from the indigenous people of the Western 
Sahara. 
                                                 
8 UN News (2018). 
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Using nationalism studies, nation- and state-building and identity research as the 
theoretical framework and constructivist worldview as the ontological basis of the 
research, two different research questions will be scrutinized. The first question concerns 
the Sahrawi nationalism and the representation of the fragmented story of the Sahrawi 
nation and asks that 1) What kind of narrative lines can be identified in the story of the 
Sahrawi nation directed to the outside audience? The second research question is more 
concerned about the structural elements of the wish-to-be state of the Sahrawi Arabic 
Democratic Republic and asks that 2) How the prerequisites for state-building and the 
nation-building of the SADR is described in the nationalistic narratives of the Sahrawis? 
The structure of the thesis follows the traditional categorization of a research paper. First, 
the background of the Western Sahara conflict will be introduced. In here, a historical 
chronological classification is used, emphasizing the origin and historical context of the 
frozen conflict. The background chapter then moves on to the many peacebuilding efforts 
in history, most of which have been directed by the United Nations. The last part of the 
chapter focusses on the political structure of the Polisario Front as a political movement 
and the living circumstances of the so-called “refugee-citizens” of the country, wishing to 
be more widely recognized in the eyes of the international community.  
The third chapter introduces the theoretical framework of the research thriving from the 
many theories regarding the processes of nation-building, nationalism and identity 
formation. A special emphasis is directed to the questions of the different aspects of 
nation-building and state-building, how the national identity is built and formed and how 
these processes are visible in the context of the Western Sahara conflict. Closer to the end 
of the chapter, a framework of different options for the traditional nation-state will be 
discussed and models, which provide a further degree of cultural autonomy are briefly 
presented. After drawing the theoretical framework for the research, the research 
questions, the material and methodological decisions are presented through careful 
reflection on the most significant considerations and limitations of the thesis. 
After that, the research findings are introduced through seven dominant narrative lines, 
which rose from the research material. These main narrative lines are titled as the 
following: 1) We, the good Sahrawis: determinant and forgiving, 2) Unique Sahrawi culture 
6 
 
– nomadic lifestyle and tea ceremonies, 3) Life of struggles, suffering and war, and 4) Our 
destiny, history and future in the first section, describing the narratives on the experienced 
and reproduced Sahrawi story of the nation. In the second section, which problematizes 
the more structural processes of state- and nation-building, the main narrative lines found 
and classified are divided into three different headlines: 1) The sea, the breeze and the 
oppression of the homeland, 2) Our communication exceeds their walls and third, (3) 
State of freedom, democracy and strong women. After the analytical classification the 
concept of “story of the nation” is discussed and conclusions from the research drawn. 
2. Background of the Western Sahara Conflict 
 
The conflict of Western Sahara is often pictured as a stalemate, which aptly reflects the 
stagnated nature of the situation. Other repeatedly used terms are ‘frozen’ and ‘forgotten’. 
To give an example of the many levels and the longitude of the conflict, we can use the 
words of Boukhars and Roussellier, who describe the conflict as “one of the most complex 
and stubborn disputes in the modern era.”9 Furthermore, Western Sahara is frequently 
cited to be ‘the last colony of Africa’. 10 While examining the existing literature, one quickly 
comes to the same conclusion as many11 before: studies of the conflict are often colored 
with activist connotations due to the lack of an ideal of impartiality.  
 
What further challenges the search for information, is the fact that the western scholar 
researchers often face some level of hostility from the Moroccan authorities in Western 
Sahara territory, varying from arrest to deportation from the country.12 It is possible to 
claim that it is not easy to get reliable data about the Western Sahara region, partly because 
it is not in Morocco’s interests to allow the information to move freely in and out of the 
area. Regardless of the many difficulties mentioned, a historical overview of the conflict 
and its background can be established. In here, the background of the conflict serves first 
and foremost as a basis and context for understanding the current state of the conflict and, 
as such, is necessarily a simplified presentation of a complex conflict with a long historical 
trajectory. 
                                                 
9 Boukhars and Roussellier 2013, p. 4. 
10 Zunes and Mundy 2010, p. 21. 
11 For example Porges and Leuprecht 2016, p. 66 and Boukhars and Amar 2011, p. 12. 
12 Boukhars and Amar 2011, p. 12. 
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The conflict in Western Sahara, geographically situated from the south of Morocco, boils 
down to the diverging views on the territory control between the Kingdom of Morocco 
and the independence movement called the Polisario Front13. The Polisario Front, a 
Sahrawi nationalist independence movement, was founded in 1973 and is based in 
Algeria.14 As often is the case in territorial conflicts, the right to control the region in 
question originates from different reasoning and historical framing between the 
conflicting parties. The Polisario Front uses the argument of the right of self-
determination of the Sahrawi nation, while Morocco sees itself having historical claims 
over the region.15  
 
The historical roots of the conflict date back to the era of the decolonization of Africa.16 
From the year 1884 till 1975, the disputed territory was called the Spanish Sahara as one 
of the colonies of Spain.17 In 1960, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) appealed 
to Spain to leave the territory in a resolution, which grants independence to colonial 
countries and peoples.18 It was followed by another resolution in 1965, repeating the 
demand. In the new resolution, the international community advised Spain to take all 
necessary measures to liberate the area from colonial domination and to enter into 
negotiations concerning the future of the territory through a process of self-
determination.19 Between 1966 and 1973, seven more UNGA resolutions followed, 
repeating the need for a referendum on the self-determination of the region.20  
 
Morocco was at first favorable to the process of self-determination, positive that it would 
result in the integration of the territory to Morocco. The King of Morocco Hassan II called 
for the opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the following rules of conduct 
in 1975.21 The International Court of Justice ruled in its advisory opinion that neither 
                                                 
13 Comes from the words Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia al Hamra and Rio de Oro. 
14 Boukhars and Roussellier 2013, p. 12. 
15 Daadoui 2008, p. 144. 
16 On broader historical background, take Abi-Mershed and Farrar 2013 chapter ‘A History of the Conflict in 
Western Sahara’ in Boukhars and Roussellier 2013 as an example. 
17 Bergh 2007, p. 662. 
18 UNGA resolution 1514 (1960). 
19 UNGA resolution 2072 (1965).  
20 Miyet 2013, p. 9. 
21 Zoubir 2007, p. 162. 
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Mauritania nor Morocco had legal claims to the territory which prevented the holding of 
a referendum on self-determination.22 Regardless of (or due to) the ICJ ruling, King Hassan 
II orchestrated the ‘Green March’, resulting in around 350,000 Moroccans crossing the 
borders of Western Sahara on the 6th of November in 1975.23 Before the ICJ declared its 
ruling, Spain had already announced its own plan to organize a referendum on the self-
determination of the region. The ruling packing the plan of Spain and the previous UNGA 
resolutions against the interests of Morocco gave it the last push to try to block any 
progress towards the potential independence of what Morocco saw as its ‘southern 
territories’.24 The Green March was a way to secure the de facto control of the region to 
be in the hands of Morocco. 
 
The mass movement of Moroccan civilians and soldiers pressured Spain to relinquish the 
Western Sahara region to Morocco and Mauritania only few days after the march. The 
administrative power Spain held was transferred to the two countries via Madrid Accords. 
On 27th February 1976, the same day Spain had left Western Sahara, the foundation of 
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) was declared, positioning Polisario Front as 
the government of the newly created country.25 The armed conflict between Polisario, 
Morocco and Mauritania escalated from the end of 1975 onwards, concluding in the 
refugee movement of masses of Sahrawis, first being internally displaced inside of the 
territory and moving later to the growing refugee settlements in neighboring Algeria.26 
Mauritania withdrew from the region in 1979 due to pressure from Polisario, Morocco 
immediately annexing the territory. Guerilla warfare against Morocco followed. Polisario 
fought against the army of Mauritania from 1975 to 1979 and the army of Morocco until 
1991, which meant a continuous war for a period of sixteen years.27 Regardless of the 
Moroccan upper hand in military power, Polisario was able to resist with the support 
coming from Algeria and their knowhow to use geography better to their advantage.28 In 
the early phases of the conflict, the Polisario Front was supported by Libya as well.29  
 
                                                 
22 International Court of Justice 1975: 12. 
23 Bergh, 2007, p. 662. 
24 Boukhars and Roussellier 2013, p. 9. 
25 Zoubir 2007, p. 162. 
26 Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011, p. 6. 
27 Martin 2017, p. 32. 
28 Jensen 2013, p. 342. 
29 Mohsen-Finan 2002, p. 3. 
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The administrative control over the territory today, around 80-85 percent of it, lies with 
Morocco, protected by defensive walls called ‘the Berm’, built in the 1980s.30 The rest of 
the area remains in the control of the Polisario Front, which is referred to as the ‘liberated 
territories’.31 Even though the Berm mitigated the aggressiveness of the conflict, armed 
clashes continued until 1988, when OAU and UN brokered a ceasefire.32 Several years 
later in 1991, conflicting parties accepted more detailed terms of a UN-supported 
referendum and signed an agreement of a further cease-fire.33 Over ten years of war had 
driven both sides to the conclusion that definitive victory with military means was not 
possible.34  
 
 
Picture 1. Four ways to show Western Sahara.35 
 
The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) started in 
September 1991 to monitor the success of the ceasefire and to support the organization 
of the referendum. The mandate of MINURSO has been repeatedly extended.36 The 
ceasefire has generally held in the region, but the transitional period before the 
agreement entered into force has not begun due to the divergent views of some elements 
of the plan. The first agreement to hold a referendum in January 1992 was postponed due 
to a fundamental disagreement on who should be eligible to vote in it. Military 
confrontation worsened into a dispute on the composition of the electorate, as both sides 
had their own view on who should be counted as a Sahrawi. Power over the definition 
                                                 
30 Boukhars and Roussellier 2013, p. 12, Jensen 2013, p. 342. 
31 Martin 2017, p. 32. 
32 Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011, p. 7. 
33 Daadaoui 2008, p. 144. 
34 Jensen 2013, p. 342. 
35 Image retrieved from: 
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/de/Maps_of_Western_Sahara.png/750px-
Maps_of_Western_Sahara.png 
36 MINURSO 2017. 
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would bring power over the result of voting.37 No process with the referendum took place 
between 1992 and 1997, arguably for three reasons from the Moroccan side: the 
uncertainty of the result, the unstable local political situation in Algeria and the lack of 
pressure from France and the United States in the fear of the possible destabilization of 
Morocco.38 The identification process of the potential voters was completed in 2000, but 
the referendum remains a part of an unfulfilled plan.39 
 
The question continues to form the very core of the Moroccan foreign politics and it also 
has plenty of homeland policy connotations. The south is on the list of continuous 
ambitious investment plans in order to develop the region, but all the universities and 
higher educational possibilities are situated in the bigger cities in the north. Natural 
resources, such as offshore oil reserves and rich fishing possibilities at the coast, have 
increased geopolitical interests in the region, which does not increase the likelihood of 
the referendum taking place anytime soon. In addition to making the lives of the Sahrawi 
refugees in Algeria difficult, the frozen conflict has multiple regional and international 
political consequences. Some examples of these are the frozen Morocco-Algeria relations, 
the debates on the legality of the European Union’s fishing agreements with Morocco and 
the fact that Morocco was long an outsider from the continental body of the African 
Union.40  
 
2.1. Peacebuilding Efforts 
 
The peacebuilding efforts between Morocco and the Polisario Front have involved many 
stages, directed mostly by the United Nations. In this section the phases of the negotiation 
processes after the ceasefire agreement of 1991 are briefly examined. First of all, keeping 
the talk about the referendum alive without further action was beneficial to Morocco, 
winning time for straightening policy lines in the domestic arena while continuing 
dominance inside the territory. However, the Polisario also had its own interests at stake 
with the delay, since the demand for a referendum gave it political space, but the loss in 
                                                 
37 Mohsen-Finan 2002, p. 6. 
38 Zoubir 2007, p. 163. 
39 Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011, p. 7. 
40 Ibid. 
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the vote risked Polisario being “swept in the dustbin of history.”41 Likewise, with Algeria’s 
interests at stake, the conflict can be described as “major political football” between North 
African countries and beyond, all countries involved or interested having their own 
interests in the situation.42  
 
After years of a considerable lack of action, the UN special envoy to Western Sahara, the 
former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, relaunched the peace process and presented 
the Houston Agreement in 1997, which was rejected by Morocco.43 After negations had 
failed to reach a mutually acceptable agreement, Baker suggested that the possible way 
out of the conflict would be to accept the region as a semi-autonomous part of Morocco in 
the form of Baker Plan I in 2000. This proposition was backed up by the United States, 
France and Morocco but opposed by the Polisario Front and Algeria.44 The proposal 
painted a future of great deal of autonomy for the Sahrawis, with Sahrawis themselves 
voting for an assembly with powers on taxation, law, education and culture. However, the 
foreign affairs and national security would stay up with Morocco to take care of. After five 
years, the future of the territory would have been decided through a referendum, with all 
living in the region having the right to vote. Due to the shift from initiating for a 
referendum to finding a political solution, the Polisario Front and Algeria criticized the 
UN system as favoring Morocco.45 
 
In 2003, a revised plan called Baker II was presented with a more detailed vision on the 
referendum process, making it more difficult to subvert the result. The second draft of the 
plan was welcomed by the Polisario but rejected by Morocco.46 The rejection of Baker II 
and the declaration by Morocco to not accept any solution endangering its sovereignty 
caused Baker to resign from his position in 2004.47 Morocco suggested a version of self-
government through the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs in 2007, which led to 
bilateral meetings with the Polisario Front in 2007-2008, with no conclusive result in the 
end.48 The meetings led by a new special envoy Peter van Walsum in New York seemed 
                                                 
41 Mohsen-Finan 2002, p. 7. 
42 Ibid, p. 3. 
43 Martin 2017, pp. 33–34. 
44 Mohsen-Finan 2002, p. 1. 
45 Ibid, pp. 7–8. 
46 Bergh 2007, p. 663. 
47 Martin 2017, p. 34. 
48 Bergh 2007, p. 663. 
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only to prove the impossibility to find common ground between the Polisario and the 
Moroccan government. Frustrated with the lack of consensus, Van Walsum, the second 
representative left in 2008 and was replaced by the U.S. diplomat Christopher Ross the 
next year. Ross was able to rebalance the UN position, leading multiple negotiation rounds 
from 2011 to 2013, not surprisingly, without an agreed conclusion in the end.49 
 
The mandate of the MINURSO operation was in danger in 2016, due to the former UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon making references to the ‘occupation’ of Western Sahara, 
while visiting Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria. What was later explained as his personal, 
spontaneous reaction stirred up strong Moroccan protests in the capital Rabat and 
beyond, questioning the neutrality of the UN in the dispute. As a consequence to the 
statement, Morocco expelled the majority of the civilian experts of the operation and 
closed its military office temporarily.50 The status of the operation has since normalized 
after, but the incidence presents an example on what kind of reactions the use of the word 
‘occupation’ can evoke in the Moroccan side. Today, MINURSO is the only modern 
peacekeeping operation without the mandate to monitor and report about human rights 
abuses. France has objected the amendment of the human rights element to the mission 
in the Security Council repeatedly.51 By the UN definition, Western Sahara has been listed 
as a non-self-governing territory already since 1963.52 
 
Morocco rejoined the African Union53 in January 2017, which it had originally left in 1984, 
when the continental body recognized the independence of the Western Sahara (SADR). 
SADR welcomed Morocco’s readmission, which brought hope in the search of new 
peaceful solutions for the fate of the territory.54 Even though the membership of both 
actors in the continental organization can form a positive basis for a further dialogue, the 
international arenas are also naturally clear positions for Morocco to further its foreign 
policy objectives and to get more support for its viewpoint on the conflict. Diplomatic 
efforts in order to end the frozen conflict in the international arenas were long on a 
standstill, due to the obstinacy of Morocco and the strong support of the United States and 
                                                 
49 Martin 2017, p. 34. 
50 Wiley and Sons 2016, pp. 20917–20918. 
51 Bolopion 2010. 
52 Smith 2005, p. 545. 
53 Former Organization of African Unity. 
54 Quinn 2017. 
13 
 
France to their close ally.55 However, many signs show that the international interest is 
once again growing towards the conflict. The latest UNSCR 2351 from April 2017 wishes 
for the parties “to show political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue 
in order to resume negotiations”.56  
 
The previous German president Horst Köhler was appointed to serve the UN Secretary 
General António Guterres as his Personal Envoy for Western Sahara in the autumn of 2017 
and he has been visiting the actors of the conflict ever since.57 When the Polisario Front 
delegation met with Köhler in January 2018, Polisario’s foreign minister Mohamed Salem 
Ould Salek soon declared to be “ready for direct negotiations with the Kingdom of 
Morocco to make peace".58 As pointed out already previously, it does seem that the 
international community is slowly rekindling efforts to improve the situation. 
 
2.2. Polisario Front and the Refugee-Citizens 
 
The Polisario Front is simultaneously representing the government of the SADR and pro-
Western Sahara independence movement activism, which makes it a multilevel actor 
politically; it is both a political movement and a representative of a government 
institution. It goes without saying that as the leader of the SADR and the Sahrawi nation, 
Polisario does not represent a homogenous group of people who agree on the terms and 
the means of the independence process. However, it is possible to try to grasp some of the 
most definitive features of the movement and the state of the Sahrawi refugee-citizens in 
the protracted refugee situation. 
 
Between the years of 1970 and 1975, the Polisario Front started to gain wide support as 
an answer to the growth of anti-colonial activism in Western Sahara against the Spanish 
military.59 The leader of the Western Saharan nationalist movement had its founding 
congress on May 10 in 1973, claiming in his first manifestation to be a “unique expression 
of the masses, opting for revolutionary violence and the armed struggle as the means by 
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which the Saharawi Arab African people can recover total liberty and foil the maneuvers 
of Spanish colonialism.”60 The name “Western Sahara” after the end of the period of 
“Spanish Sahara” was first used by the international community in the early 1970s, rather 
than the native inhabitants.61 
 
The UN Mission of Inquiry in Spanish Sahara declared in 1975, after witnessing major pro-
Polisario demonstrations, that there was an “overwhelming consensus among Saharans 
within the Territory in favor of independence” and “support for one movement, the Frente 
Polisario”.62 Since the 1970s, Polisario has legitimized its control over the Sahrawi 
‘refugee-citizens’ in Algeria through establishing a constitution, a police force and prisons, 
an army, legal framework and many ‘national’ institutions, such as the National 
Parliament and the National Hospital.63 The SADR defines itself as a sovereign, 
independent and free state, governed by a democratic system.64 However, the democracy 
of the wannabe state is contestable: the Polisario Front is the only political party that 
governs the region. However, the political movement claims that the objective is to 
transform the SADR into a multi-party system first thing after gaining independence.65 
 
As a full fledge member of the African Union, the Sahrawi Arabic Democratic Republic has 
signed and ratified many continental agreements, such as the African Charter on Human 
and People’s Rights. In contrast, it has neither an observer status nor any other form of 
official status in the United Nations, which prevents it to participate to the structuring and 
implementation processes of the international law in the framework of all the UN 
institutions.66 In the course of history, 84 states have recognized the SADR, from which 27 
states have then later retracted their recognition and eight states have frozen theirs. In 
2018, 49 states continued to recognize the Polisario run country, which is around one 
fourth of the countries worldwide.67  
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The Sahrawis have lived as a divided nation for decades, some in the territory under 
Moroccan control, some in the west side controlled by Polisario and the rest as refugees 
in Algeria, other in neighboring countries and around Europe.68 The conflict and the 
protracted refugee situation linked to it has remained as a marginal concern in the 
western world.69 According to some estimations, approximately 20,000 Sahrawi refugees 
live in the open desert in the Polisario Front governed area between the Berm and the 
borders.70 Moreover, the UNCHR registration documented in 1999 that there are over 
26,000 Sahrawis who lived in Mauritania and would have had the right to vote in the 
referendum for self-determination. In the same year the estimation of Sahrawi refugees 
living in Algeria was 165, 000 by the Algerian government.71 Estimations from the number 
of refugees who have continued to further than Algeria vary, due to the difficulty in 
definition: most states do not recognize SADR as a country of origin, which makes the 
Sahrawis mostly ‘Moroccan’ in the statistics of refugees and immigrants. 
 
The UNHCR has called the Sahrawi refugee situation in Algeria as “one of the most 
protracted refugee situations worldwide”72 and it remains as the organization’s second 
oldest refugee situation still existing today. With varying estimations73, around 155,00074 
Sahrawi refugees live in the five major camps named after the main cities in Western 
Sahara75. These village camps are governed by a Sahrawi governor (wālī) and divided into 
smaller districts and neighborhoods. A high level of self-management and the Polisario 
control over the camps and its citizens distinguishes the Sahrawi refugee camps from the 
majority of the refugee situations worldwide, where the camps are usually administered 
by an organization such as the UNHCR.76 Over the years, the refugee camps have been 
transformed into more structured entities, close to a state structure with political and 
administrative institutions. The politico-administrative structure and the central 
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governing of villages in the refugee settlements makes them comparable to the 
Palestinian case.77 The Sahrawi camps have been praised over the years due to the 
democratic political structures, high level of female participation in the society and the 
self-sufficiency of its citizens. Even though the camps are highly dependent on the 
international humanitarian aid, it is generally distributed by the Sahrawi refugees 
themselves. However, at worst, these praises have the risk of making the protracted 
refugee situation and the status quo as the new normal.78 
 
The refugee camps have been subjected to many changes over the years, such as increased 
migration to Spain, the introduction of a market economy and a recent change in the 
leadership of the movement. President Mohamed Abdelaziz, the historic leader of the 
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic since its founding in 1976, passed away in 2016. His 
successor, Brahim Ghali, has adopted a more aggressive approach by stirring up old 
tensions and moving military troops to the Moroccan separation wall.79 Since the 
establishment of the camps in 1975, a ‘solidarity movement’ for the Sahrawi 
independence cause starting by the Spanish and French civil society has helped to secure 
the political and physical survival of the camps.80 Some humanitarian supplies like tents 
and medical items were provided by the ICRC81 and the Algerian government with some 
‘friendly states’, such as Spain82, Cuba, Libya, Syria and South Africa, offering financial and 
political support.83 Opportunities in the camps are rare, despite the few employment 
places in the administration and many in the army, which result in most of the educated 
youth moving to study abroad. However, in addition to basic primary and secondary 
schooling, some professional training is available on computer, vocational and technical 
training courses and a nursing college.84 
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Due to the current political circumstances and the refusal of both Polisario and Algeria to 
support the local integration of the Sahrawi refugees into the Algerian military town of 
Tindouf, the general popular opinion of the international community is that the refugee 
situation will be  prolonged in the  upcoming years as well.85 In addition to the larger 
political forces, many individual refugees themselves reject the propositions of local 
integration or resettlement to another country as possible durable solutions. For them, 
obtaining voluntary repatriation after the declaration of Western Sahara as an 
independent country is seen as the only solution to the situation at hand.86  
 
There is a slight tendency of people moving away from the administrative core of the 
camps to enforce their independence and privacy from Polisario and international 
agencies. Moreover, Polisario has proposed to shift the administration from Algerian 
Rabouni to Tifariti, a small settlement of camps on the Polisario govern side of Western 
Sahara. The resettlement would mean the Sahrawi people’s status being transformed 
from refugees to internally displaced people, which would have both legal and political 
consequences. Morocco sees movement close to the Berm as ‘provocation’, which renders 
the international and local reactions to the possible permanent resettlement of the 
Sahrawi refugees unpredictable.87 
 
The nonviolent resistance of the Sahrawis has a long history in the conflict. Some describe 
the nonviolent protests as intifada-type movements, which have some similar features to 
the uprisings in Palestinian territories.88 Multiple nonviolent demonstrations in 1999, 
2005 and 2009 provided a basis for the largest demonstration in decades, for the Gdeim 
Izik protest camp in 2010.89 Gdeim Izik demonstrations started to get a more organized 
structure when a group of Saharawi activists set up tents on 9th October in 2010, around 
12 kilometers from Western Sahara’s capital Laayoune, protesting against the economic 
and social discrimination they suffer from in the region.90 Even though the original reason 
for the emergence of the protests was the dissatisfaction to the situations of housing and 
employment, protests got nationalist connotations when the mobilization widened and 
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developed.91 92 The United Nations estimates the protest to have expanded to around 
6,610 tent settlements with the number of protesters going beyond 15,000.93 As a 
collective mobilization of resistance, the protest settlements of Gdeim Izik reinforced the 
Sahrawi national identity.94 The demonstration started to grow uncontrollably after a 
Sahrawi boy was killed by the Moroccan police.95 Following to the non-transparent line of 
the country, Morocco limited the media and outside observers coverage on the protests 
and objected to MINURSO’s monitors having an access to the protest camps.96 In the early 
hours of the 8th of November, the confrontation escalated, leading up to 11 Moroccans and 
4 Sahrawis dead.97 
 
Even though the resistance of the Sahrawis has been mostly non-violent, the long-
continued frustration of the youth and the lack of opportunities are in danger to add up 
to violence and radicalization. The UNHCR estimates, that overall from all the Sahrawi 
refugee population even 60 % are youth.98 Following the frustration felt from the 
prolonged lack of progress and the authoritarian way of leadership, multiple accusations 
against the Polisario Front have been presented concerning corruption, elitism, favoritism 
and the attempts to silence disagreeing voices within the movement.99  
 
Recently, the refugee camps have witnessed an increasing unrest, especially among the 
young members of the Sahrawi society. Some Sahrawis would be ready to take up arms 
against Morocco, some would be happy with a bigger role in the inner decision-making 
processes of the community, while others would, first and foremost, hope to improve their 
poor living conditions.100 Kidnappings and arrests indicate that criminal organizations 
and radical groups are attempting to get a foothold in the Western Sahara and in the 
refugee camps in Algeria, even though it seems that the Polisario leaders are trying to 
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prevent this.101 Furthermore, there are challenges such as interstate smuggling, drug 
trafficking, socioeconomic unrest and poverty, waiting to be tackled in the Polisario Front 
governed refugee camps of the Sahrawis. 102  
 
3. Nation-Building, Nationalism and Identity 
 
In this next theory-driven chapter, the interplay of nation-building, nationalism and 
identity research will be examined – first separately and then combined, through 
examples of the distant nation-building concept, the Sahrawi nationalism history and 
their national identity forming process. These three core concepts of nation-building, 
nationalism and identity, form together the theoretical framework, which serve as the 
basis for further Western Sahara conflict context specific arguments made. To understand 
these concepts, each of them needs to be defined and then elaborated in the context of the 
complex, close to frozen conflict situation. 
 
In the world of nation-states, nation-building is often understood as a process that every 
nation-state is implicitly or explicitly subjected to, because without a nation there can be 
no nation-state to do the ‘building’ in. However, this nation-state-bounded understanding 
of the concept can be easily challenged. We should not take nation-states for granted as 
the only valid form of a state, regardless of whether it is the current norm in the world 
politics of today or not. As Mann103 puts it: “The nation-state is not hegemonic, nor is it 
obsolete, either as a reality or as an ideal.” The belief that every nation should have their 
own state dates all the way back to the rise of nationalism.  
 
Historically wise, nationalism needs to be understood as something peculiarly modern.104 
The principle of nationalism guided the change of the traditional state system in the 
nineteenth century towards the models of current nation-states. There are two main 
principles in nation and nationalities. First, the demand for self-government and freedom 
from foreign rule, meaning that each nation should have their own state and second, the 
objective of national unity and the demand for the whole nation to form a state.105 
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Nationalism is a product of the political history of Europe, which makes the autobiography 
of nationalism biased.106 It is important for the limits of this understanding to be 
recognized, but the consequences of the West-centered biases will be left to another time, 
place and writer to dwell into deeper.107 
 
Nation-states can be understood as political units or polities, which link sovereignty to the 
culture.108 In the liberal nation-states of today, the culture of the dominant nation, the 
major ethnic group of the state, is predominantly derived from the experiences and 
understandings of the dominant national community inside of the state.109 This means 
that there is often only little room for de facto multiethnic mix of people inside of nation-
states. This again raises several issues from exclusion inside of the state to the 
independence efforts in many parts of the world: Catalonia in Spain, Kurdistan in Turkey 
and the Kashmir region in India, to name a few examples in addition to the case example 
of this research, the Western Sahara conflict.  
 
In order to dissect the concept of a nation-state itself into smaller parts, the concept of a 
nation can be scrutinized for example through the concept of national character. National 
character is the complex of physical and mental characteristics that distinguish one nation 
from another and change and evolve with time.110 A state, on the other hand, can be 
classified in here as a geopolitical entity, where membership is based on shared civic 
values and gained through citizenship.111 Nations, similar to individuals, are thought to 
have identities, usually based on the national characters, either mythical or really 
somehow at least partly observable in the physical and in the social reality.  
 
Thus, a national identity exists simultaneously on two different levels: (1) in the 
individuals understanding of themselves as national actors, and (2) in the collective 
identity in relation to others of the same kind, of the same nation.112 Ulrike and Kloke-
Lesch113 crystallize the purpose of the national identity well: “The development of a 
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national identity helps the population to grow together into a collective community of 
will.” Whoever then belongs to this ‘community of will’ can be determined on the basis of 
origin, citizenship, language or other determinants. Whatever the case is, national identity 
and development of common political will are frequently negotiated through the 
institutional shaping of nation and conflicts of social and political life.114 A community of 
will can gain or lose members via immigration, demographic shifts or in the worst case, 
in the battlefield of violent conflicts. Demographic changes in states raise questions about 
national identity and belonging and often lead to concerns among the “native population” 
about the future of their society.115 Naturally, a community or state can be more or less 
inclusive towards its new members, as is proved from the example of the differences 
between different European countries regarding their current refugee and migration 
policies. 
 
3.1.  Nation-Building and State-Building 
 
Nation-building processes can be directed either from the inside or the outside of a state. 
However, it is easy to draw conclusions on which one of these directions is more efficient, 
ethical and sustainable. Some of the examples in modern history, such as the cases of Iraq 
and Afghanistan, show us, what kind of situation an outside manufactured nation- or 
state-building process efforts with rapid regime changes and power vacuums can create. 
In the case of the Western Sahara conflict, the concept of nation-building could be 
discussed from various point of views. Nevertheless, what is most interesting regarding 
he scope of this research, is the Polisario Front led nation-building processes of the 
Sahrawi people. In order to highlight the differences between nation-building processes 
and the more structural toolkit of state-building, also the concept of state-building will be 
briefly introduced.  
 
The term ‘nation-building’ was already an important concept in the 1950s and 1960s, but 
it only got more wind under its wings after the end of the Cold War, when the increase of 
regional and intrastate conflicts followed the shattered power order of 1991. In the 
international arenas, nation-building is often discussed as a preventive political option to 
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avoid social fragmentation, as an alternative for military intervention or as an element of 
constructing policies after a conflict.116 However, this understanding, close to the concept 
of state-building, will not be the focus of this thesis. In the reality of states, nation-building 
is a part of what states do internally. The ‘doing’ of nation-building is concretized both in 
the institutional and the cultural level of human interaction, such as in the constitution, 
state institutions and national songs and holidays. On the level of international politics, 
nation-building is something more strategical. It is a tool that can be used externally. In 
addition to this internal and international differentiation, developing the writings of 
Hippler, nation-building can be defined in at least two ways: 1) Nation-building as a 
process of political and social development, which together form a common society within 
the structure of a nation-state (analytical nation-building) or 2) nation-building as a 
political strategy or objective, strived from either within a state or from outside its 
borders (normative nation-building).117  
 
The nation-building process involves creation of new structures and replacement of both 
old social and political ones. As a result, it is always inseparably connected with the 
redistribution of power.118 Those in power will surely resist the transformation – the ones 
having power are never too keen to give it to a new pair of hands. According to Pfaff-
Czarnecka119, countries go through three stages in their process of nation-building. The 
desirable, but not necessarily realistic, linear process develops from (1) ethnically 
complex and hierarchically organized societies inside of states to (2) nations valuing 
cultural similarity in nation-states to (3) the pluralistic-egalitarian models, which form 
national unity, but nevertheless recognizes and values diversity. Like many other 
countries with problems of cultural and minority exclusion, Morocco and the Sahrawi 
Arabic Democratic Republic seem both to be on the “level 2” of the process, with the SADR 
closer to the transition from the phase one to the phase two. However, it is hard to find 
examples from countries that would perfectly fit in to the third category of the pluralistic-
egalitarian model, if there even are any. 
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Nation-building needs sociocultural structuring and a process which will ideally lead to a 
shared national identity, values and goals. What is more important than the similarity of 
these values and goals is the inclusivity and recognition of differences inside of the shared 
identity.120 It is possible to argue, that a certain degree of confessed values and goals or at 
least a shared myth of these is important, but the diversity of values and goals is an 
undeniable feature of every (democratic) nation-state. A common goal could be existing as 
a nation, but that is where shared goals of a nation-state often end.  
 
However, it is not rare to talk about the values of a region or a state to characterize the 
culture and socio-political orientation of it, but if we would critically narrow down the 
scope of the examination to the level of states, the abstract character of the shared values 
becomes more visible. To simply put; we can talk in general terms about how Americans 
value freedom and Japanese modesty, but we cannot argue that these values would form 
the core of these nations – or that every Japanese values modesty more than freedom and 
every American values freedom over modesty. 
 
In order to illustrate the concepts of analytical and normative nation-building more 
clearly, the nation-building processes of the actors in the Western Sahara conflict will be 
examined next. In the context of the conflict, the concept of nation-building can actually 
be examined from four different perspectives. First, it can be seen as a strategy of the West 
to keep Morocco stable due to the economic and political interests of its allies. Second, it 
could be examined via the support of Algeria to the Sahrawi Arabic Democratic Republic 
to establish a functioning state within the Western Sahara. Third, the concept could be 
scrutinized as an attempt of Morocco to unify the Western Sahara with the other regions 
in Morocco through the process of morocanisation and regional investments. Fourth, it 
could be seen as an political objective of the Polisario Front process in order to strengthen 
the political system of the SADR and gain international legitimacy to the independence of 
it. Due to the restrictions of the scope of the research, only the two latter examples of a 
nation-building process in the context of the Western Sahara conflict will be discussed in 
greater detail. 
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Nation-building process has the prerequisites to be successful in the long run only if the 
basis of the process roots from an unifying ideology, which in the two examples shortly 
introduced are both different variations of nationalism.121 In Moroccan efforts in keeping 
the Western Sahara region, the ideology lies on the concept of greater Morocco. 
Furthermore, it lies in the identity of being a Moroccan, which is at its core believed to be 
something different from being an Algerian, a Mauritanian, a Spanish and certainly 
something else than being a citizen of the SADR. On the other hand, on the Sahrawi Arabic 
Democratic Republic side, the ideological foundation comes from the generally accepted 
legal principle of self-determination of a nation and the ethnic, linguistic and cultural 
identity of being a Sahrawi, which is something different than being a Moroccan.  
 
The aim to keep Morocco as stable as possible partly explains the lack of initiative for 
many Western countries to take too strong stands against the country. A calm and stable, 
regionally unified Morocco with managed marginal regional conflict serves the interests 
of her allies best, mainly the United States and France. In addition to the economic 
incentives, Morocco is an important partner in the areas of countering extremist violence 
and radicalization, as well as a gate keeper of closed doors between the continents of 
Africa and Europe from refugees hoping to get inside of the European Union. 122 The wider 
the process of moroccanization in the regions is, the smaller the breathing space for the 
Sahrawi culture and national identity gets. Nevertheless, as long as the primary identity 
of the Sahrawi people and other ethnic minorities in Morocco lies within the ethnic group 
with weaker national identity of being Moroccan, the nation-state will run the risk of being 
destabilized.123 
 
Morocco clearly operates within the scope of analytical nation-building, as it is already an 
established nation-state. The state has built strong Moroccan nationalism through long 
historical roots but also with the help of wide personal cult behind the king. The current 
King of Morocco, Mohammed VI, has ruled the country since 1999 and is highly popular 
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throughout the country. What adds up to his popularity, is that he is believed to have 
descented from the prophet Mohammed of Islam himself, which makes him 
simultaneously the legitimate ruler of the religious elite of the country as well. Political 
corruption and regional inequalities are real problems, but the king of the country, who 
is seen to be ‘the protecting father’ of the country is seldom held responsible. It would 
therefore seem, that economically growing Morocco has succeeded in the process of 
nation-building rather well since its independence from colonial France in 1956.  
 
However, the many minorities of the country might not agree. The religious, sexual124, 
linguistic and ethnic minorities do not have the same rights in the country as Moroccans, 
who practice Islam and speak Darija125. Some ethnic minorities, in addition to the Sahrawi 
people, demand wider socio-political rights with more or less secessionist 
connotations.126 The objective of Morocco is thereafter to keep the nation as unified as 
possible with the help of the tools such as military force, strong central government 
authority, protest containment and investment plans for the economically speaking 
neglected North and South of the country. Attempts to unify the many ethnicities of the 
country can be seen to belong to the field of analytical nation-building. A unified Morocco 
is the ultimate political and cultural aim, regardless of the ways the goal is achieved. 
 
The Polisario Front and the SADR build more on the basis of normative nation-building, 
because the structure of a nation-state is an objective, not political reality. One could argue 
that we cannot speak about nation-building in a context, where there is no unified and 
completely recognized state. However, it is obvious that the Polisario Front aims at 
achieving a state, and in order to achieving that aim, it uses the toolkit of normative 
nation-building. This politico-strategic process of nation-building allows us to examine 
the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic from the viewpoint of nation-building, regardless 
of the differing views concerning the status of the Sahrawi people as citizens of a nation. 
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What could be a less contradictory observation, is that the SADR attempts to legitimize 
the country’s status in international arenas, to create a unified nation of Sahrawi refugees 
and to convince the international community on the necessity of the Sahrawi Arab 
Democratic Republic. The objective is backed by the government of Algeria, which is 
supporting the young (hoping to be) state inside of its own national borders. It would be 
possible to claim that a nation must have established a steady ground first with the help 
of normative nation-building process before it can be further developed through social 
and political reforms, which fall to the side of analytical nation-building. 
 
In addition to the politico-cultural aspects of nation-building, there are practical 
requirements for the workings of the process. Nation-building cannot efficiently function 
without national or state infrastructure. The building of a nation needs physical, social 
and media infrastructure that is accessible to the entire civil society.127 Furthermore, the 
national economy, communication, transport and nationwide media channels are crucial 
in order to establish a national cultural, social and political discourse. In addition to the 
communication channels and a national economy, a state also needs an effective fiscal 
system, organized police and legal forces and an administration to govern the different 
domains.128 However, it is difficult to build a nationwide infrastructure and 
administration without a state entity controlling the territory. A nation function best 
inside of the political entity of a state, which is why the concept of state-building is often 
discussed beside the concept of nation-building.  
 
State-building often refers to the process of building a state after military intervention or 
instead of a military intervention. It aims to stabilize potentially or clearly unstable 
countries, who are at the risk of collapsing into a chaos or internal violent conflict. Both 
of these cases, led by a military force or with more subtle means, state-building can be 
characterized to be more or less interventionist in nature.129 Even though state-building 
usually refers to as something done by the outside powers of a country, in this context 
state-building is seen more as a structured framework for nation-building – processes 
that can go hand in hand with each other in exceptional contexts as the Western Sahara 
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conflict. The objective of the Polisario Front is to build a nation and to have a state for the 
nation. 
 
Some of the components of state-building are relatively easy to obtain from outside, such 
as help to build functioning and nationwide infrastructure of roads and railways. 
However, some of the components must come from within a state, as is the case with the 
ideological basis of a shared national identity.130 The attempts of Morocco to highlight the 
support of Algeria for the SADR strives to make the demands of the Sahrawi less 
legitimate. If the dispute was only about regional dominance between Morocco and 
Algeria, such thing as ‘the voice of the Sahrawis’ would not exist to be taken into 
consideration. Even though we should acknowledge the importance of the Algeria’s 
support for the Polisario in the military and economic aspects, it is important to point out 
the identity of being a Sahrawi or not is close to impossible to be artificially manufactured 
from the outside. 
 
Nevertheless, strong national infrastructure, media network and shared culture are not 
all there is in a state. To be fully considered as an independent state, a state requires 
international recognition of other states, which ultimately often happens through 
admission to the United Nations. In other words, “each nation must make ‘sense’ to the 
world around it.”131 The questions of political recognition are important for the evaluation 
of the aims and demands of the ethnic and national minorities as well.132 Political 
recognition should first be established among the members of the national community, 
secondly by the surrounding nations and lastly in the eyes of the international community. 
There are many political entities which get stuck on the first or second levels, having 
legitimacy among its own, but not being credible in the eyes of most of the countries or 
nations around the world. That is, what the Polisario Front is currently struggling with: 
not being accepted as a state in the eyes of Morocco, many other states and the wider 
international community. 
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3.2. Nationalism and National Identity 
 
As stated before, nation-building needs an ideological basis that gives it legitimacy and 
fuel, which is often nationalism. A nation links a state to its subjects and distinguishes 
them from the subjects of other states.133 A crucial part of nationalism is on some level the 
idea of shared national identity, and the relationship individuals have to their own nation. 
The concepts of nationalism and national identity are interconnected and they are 
therefore analyzed in parallel to each other in this following chapter.  
 
First of all it is useful to notice, that it is easy to take nationalism for granted, both in the 
everyday life of international and national politics. We tend to notice its existence only 
when it triggers social conflicts or manifests itself in a violent manner. However, it has 
been and is there all along, throughout the relatively short history of nation-states. 
Nationalism has its role in the foundation of the daily working mechanisms of nation-
states – in the language people speak, in the passport they carry and in the way they look 
and understand history. Nationalism is the basis for collective identity and to the form of 
a nation-state, which has dominated for over than the last 200 years.134 
 
Before the modern era, the term ‘nation’ meant people who shared culture and a place of 
birth. The earliest examples of modern nationalism have been identified from the tensions 
that led to the English Civil War, in the Latin American independence movement and in 
the French Revolution. By the end of the eighteenth century and the French Revolution in 
1789, the discursive formation of nationalism was already prospering.135 As often is the 
case with the history of concepts in social reality, the history of nationalism can be 
explored from various points of views. More than from the changes of rule in states, 
Bauer136 seeks explanations from the merge of modern capitalism, which has produced 
national culture for all people. The change has taken place by uprooting the population 
from the agricultural lifestyle and redirecting them by place and profession towards the 
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formation of modern classes and professions.  Modern national culture is achieved 
through democracy, education, military service and equal suffrage.137 Also Benedict 
Anderson argues that the first nation-states in Europe were founded and based around 
their national print languages, because before that nation-wide communication was not 
possible and accessible for most of the citizens.138 
 
Anderson must be among the most cited authors in research on nationalism. He has 
defined nations as ‘imagined communities’ which describe the non-tangible nature of 
social communities and relations well: they are there, because they are believed to be 
there. Anderson writes, that a nation "is imagined because the members of even the 
smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear 
of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion"139. However, 
members of the community are not seen only in relation to the other members of the 
community, but also to the others in different communities. The knowledge of life outside 
of the nation’s boundaries is the ‘precondition of all national consciousness.140 Derichs 
strengthens the understanding of nations as something invented, not formulated on the 
basis of the real world or needs, as she writes:   
“A nation emerges as a conceived community irrationally, as it were, since ‘reason’ would 
suggest that each member of society should look after him or herself and accept an 
individual or…particular (cultural, religious, ethnic, social) identity.”141 
 
Nationalism can be seen to have three different dimensions. First, nationalism can be 
understood as a discourse, which refers to the production process of cultural 
understanding and the framing of the world through the concepts of nationalism and 
national identity. Second, nationalism can be looked upon as a project, which refers to 
social movements and policies through which people try to advance their collective 
interests, for example in the sector of foreign policy. Third, nationalism can be 
conceptualized as evaluation, when political ideologies claim superiority of one nation 
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over the others.142 National identification can build self-esteem: citizens feel good about 
themselves and about their relation to the society, when they belong to a nationality they 
consider superior to others.143 
 
Even though nationalism is based on a shared idea of a shared community, the individual 
aspect of it is equally important. The discourse of nations is colored in terms of 
identification and passion, while that of states is analyzed more through the concepts of 
reason and interests: “Nationalism has emotional power…because it helps us to make who 
we are.”144 Systems of social classification establish grounds of legitimacy via the 
categories they create and make the categories seem natural as well as socially real. This 
makes nations as aspects of political and symbolic order, but also a part of social 
interaction and feeling.145 Nationalism is close to every citizen or a member of the group 
with the help of the individual’s experience, while the state is more distant, bureaucratic 
and far emotionally. 
 
Nationalism lifts its head in the national celebrations of independence days, in the 
traditional culture preservation efforts and in the violence of radical right-wing activist 
against immigrants and refugees. Nationalism demands some level of similarity, 
something shared that everyone can name but cannot grasp on in the physical reality. 
Even though we can differentiate more and less constructive forms and manifestations of 
nationalism, all the forms of national identity and loyalty are shaped by the common 
discourses of nationalism.146  
 
Calhoun introduces ten characteristics that are often combined with the rhetoric of a 
nation: 1) boundaries of territory and population; 2) indivisibility, seeing the nation as an 
integral unit; 3) sovereignty, usually in the form of a state; 4) legitimacy of the government 
through the will of the people; 5) participation in collective affairs 6) direct membership 
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to the nation; 7) shared culture with some combination of language, beliefs and values; 8) 
shared history; 9) common descent and 10) relations to a territory.147  In different nations 
different points are more important than others and in all nations all of the introduced 
aspects can not necessarily be found. In the case of the Sahrawi people, the aspects of 
shared culture and history, mostly common descent and genetic origin, relation to the 
Western Sahara territory, the indivisibility and legitimacy are the most apparent. 
However, even though the combination of these elements often varies in different states, 
some of the relationships in nations cannot be replaced. A ‘memory’ of the common past 
or history, a density of linguistic and cultural ties enabling social communication and the 
conception of the equality for all members of the same national group are close to 
essential ones.148  
 
National and abstract boundaries separate an inside from an outside and set lines to 
diversity and difference. That makes them closely linked to the construction, production 
and reproduction of identities and the dichotomies of ‘us’ versus ‘them’149 In the case of 
nation-sates, formulating the recipe of national identity is the task of the government 
inside of the state institution. State policies, which regulate the behavior of people 
residing in a country have effects in the national identity. Especially policies concerning 
immigration, annexing or colonizing another country, and policies regarding the 
citizenship are good examples of the interconnectedness of national identity and the 
possibility of a state to govern the terms of the inclusion.150  
 
The government of a state has the ways and the infrastructure to spread the ‘national’ 
idea among its citizens via the administrative machinery and mass media.151 Moreover, 
national symbols, songs, flags and national holidays combine culture to the idea of shared 
national identity. If the security, economic and social policy domains are functioning well 
for everyone, national cohesion is stronger and the acceptance of the national identity 
become easier to accept.152 On the other side of the coin, if the development of the 
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economy has stagnated or taken steps back, it can create mistrust towards the leaders of 
the country and question the pride people have for their national identity.153 For strong 
national identity the citizens of the nation must feel they are getting something back from 
the loyalty they give. 
 
National identity is an ‘ideal type’ of concept and describes better the world of theory than 
the world of reality. In other words, although there are certain generalizable features 
between different national identity processes, the empirical study of national identities 
always has to take into account the peculiar contextual, cultural and historical factors that 
affect to the actual formation of the national identity and its meanings. Regardless of the 
many debates over the term, different scholars usually agree that a national identity is a 
sense of belonging to a nation or a state, which is affected by various factors, such as 
relational, normative, contextual and historical factors. In short, national identity is a 
sense of belonging to a geopolitical entity, a state.154  
 
3.3. Identity Formation 
 
Identity and kindred terms in other languages have a long history as one of the core 
concepts in Western philosophy, dating back from the Greeks to the modern political and 
social sciences. The term was originally borrowed from Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis 
to the social sciences and started gaining ground in the 1960s in the United States. 
Responding strongly to the rise of individualism and ethnic movements demanding their 
rights, the use of the term ‘identity’ spread quickly to the domains of journalism, academia 
and political analysis.155 Today, the use of the term has prospered in the fields from 
academia to practice, and even work on gender, ethnicity, immigration, culture, race and 
religion have felt the need to address the question of identity.156  
 
Identities are shaped, reproduced and shifted with time, context and place. A particular 
identity must be seen as coined from a particular time and place, not as something stable 
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and unchangeable. It is never everywhere the same, but it is nonetheless there.157 A few 
key uses of the term of identity can be identified, even though the use shifts from the 
research field and scope of the analysis. Identity can be understood as 1) a basis for 
socially or politically motivated action, differentiated from shared interests; 2) a collective 
denominator of the similarity of the members of a group, which can be understood 
objectively or subjectively; 3) a core understanding of a social being in comparison to 
other social beings; 4) an end product of social or political action, processual development 
of collective self-understanding; 5) the multiple, fluctuating and unstable “self”, used 
especially in the post-structuralism, post-modernism and ethnicity literature.158 Reading 
the list makes it clear, that the term has a lot of work to do and many different meanings 
to cover. Buckley-Zistel argues, that people need a sense of identity and belonging, a 
feeling of limits and boundaries, not because of ‘human nature’ or needs, but because 
without identities sociality would be impossible.159 Shared concepts, meanings and 
understandings ‘language games’ are needed for interaction to be meaningful.  
 
Some constructivists in the field do not claim the ‘identity talk’ as theirs. Brubaker and 
Cooper argue that the use of the word ‘identity’ has gone too far. The fussiness of the 
concept, identity being never the same everywhere and moving together with time and 
place, make it a problematic concept for the field of social sciences. ‘Identity’ easily means 
either too much, if we understand it in a strong sense, and too little, if we understand it in 
a weak sense. The constructivist understanding of identity as something constructed, fluid 
and multiple sets challenges to talk about identities at all.160 What we call identities are 
really combinations of multiple self-identifications, which arise from various sources and 
have unpredictable behavioral consequences.161  
 
However, we can argue that most of the terms in social sciences, especially in the 
ontological understanding of constructivism, is trying to grasp on something fluid and 
constructed. The ever changing social reality does not prevent us on trying to make 
imperfect models from it, no matter how constructed the reality is. We have to have 
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terminology, which is broad at its spectrum, if the goal is not to separate different domains 
of social sciences even further away from each other. The much echoing demand of 
multidisciplinary approaches on the staircases of peace and conflict research is possible 
only if the shared concepts can be used effectively and broadly in the research field.  
 
Surely, the broadness of the term ‘identity’ can be criticized – only with genuine critique 
we can see the true explanatory power of different concepts. In Brubaker and Coopers 
view, the main issue lies on the use of the term as both in the categories of practice and in 
the categories of analysis.162 We should try to avoid accidentally reproducing meanings 
by taking them for granted and by adopting terms of practice as terms of analysis:  
 
“Just as one can analyze ‘nation-talk’ and nationalist politics without positing the existence 
of ‘nations’…one can analyze ‘identity-talk’ and identity politics without, as analysts, 
positing the existence of ‘identities’.”163  
 
Not to be guilty for criticizing without a clear alternative, seven terms are introduced to 
replace the use of the word ‘identity’ in different contexts: identification, categorization, 
self-understanding, social location, commonality, connectedness and groupness. As is the 
case with identity, how one identifies oneself may vary greatly with different time, context 
and place. The state is a strong identifier, not because of its capability to create identities, 
but because it has the infrastructure to impose the social categories with administration 
and cultural influence. Categorization require identifying yourself or someone fit to a 
certain description or a specific social category such as ‘a feminist’, ‘a conservative’ or ‘a 
vegetarian’.  
 
The writers argue that self-understanding is a dispositional term similar to “situated 
subjectivity”, describing one’s own understanding of who she or he is, strongly linked to 
one’s social location. The experience of belonging to a special group with the feeling of 
solidarity and oneness with other group members and the different levels of the felt 
solidarity can be described through terms of commonality, connectedness and groupness. 
Strong sense of groupness can have its foundation on commonality and a feeling of 
belonging together with a minimal level of connectedness, for example with entities as 
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‘nations’.164 Even though these suggested terms seem to succeed in grasping on the many 
meanings identity is used referring to, changing the terms in the field would need a lot of 
effort and development further. Identity as a concept is so strongly rooted into the 
vocabulary in the fields of international relations and peace and conflict research and 
most of the researchers in these fields seem to acknowledge its usefulness.  
 
3.4. From Nation-State Ideals to More Autonomy 
 
It is easy to state that nation-states have never been unproblematic entities in the short 
but flourishing history of the concept. Nation-states have provided a spark for violent 
conflicts throughout world history, whether the case has been about independence efforts 
or the repression of a religious, ethnic or lingual minority to name just a few examples. 
The claim for the state structure of a nation has succeeded in cases such as Israel and 
(more or less with) Kosovo, but remains as an unfulfilled objective in other cases, like the 
Sahrawis, the Kurds and the Palestinians. The political problems and human rights 
violations of ethnic minorities in most nation-states have been mostly dealt with either 
democratic representation, political repression or violent conflict. There is no country in 
the whole wide world, who could pride oneself upon respecting the political rights of the 
minorities fully throughout all of its history. 
 
As a concept, multiculturalism is respected only in the third state of nation-building 
previously introduced, which not only requires creating a national unity, but also both 
recognizing and accepting diversity.165 It seems clear that there are not too many countries 
which would deserve a place on that list. However, some examples of the most inclusive 
third level nation-building can be found from states such as Sweden, Canada and 
Indonesia. Nevertheless it seems, that no matter how the representational and legal 
questions in different countries are dealt with, there are no nation-building processes 
without some degree of political or legal mess.  
 
One could argue that the defenders of traditional liberal nationalism ignore the 
contradiction of shared national culture as supporting the dominancy of one cultural 
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group at the expense of the other. The reasoning behind the ignorance is clear. If liberal 
nationalists argue that it is desirable for states to be always specifically nation-states, 
multinational states face two unattractive options: to split the country along national 
division or to allow the larger national group to assimilate the smaller ones to the majority 
culture.166 In the context of the Western Sahara conflict, the former is what the Polisario 
Front is aiming for and the latter is what Morocco is currently doing.  
 
Both strategies have been equally applied around the world with more or less 
catastrophic results. National minorities can only secure the fulfilling of their cultural 
needs if they gain power in the legislative and administrative domains of a state. They are 
systematically excluded from the core of power because they are minorities.167 The 
majority of current nation-states are ethnically multination states that endorse the legal, 
political and cultural customs of dominant nations.168 In order to answer to this demand 
created by a contradiction, the two following parts present briefly different alternatives 
for traditional nation-states: federalism and autonomy, which are highly used ways to 
overcome the ‘tyranny of the majority’ and a National-Cultural Autonomy Model, which 
remains less addressed, but highlights the fact that there are options, which would require 
further exploring and developing in the scheme of nationalism research. 
 
According to recent research in the field of nationalism studies, federalist structures are 
regarded as the best institutional option to transform violent ethnic conflicts into peaceful 
ones.169 What is intriguing in the case example of the Western Sahara conflict, is that the 
asymmetric federalist systems are more frequently designed to overcome ethnic conflicts 
than symmetric ones.170 Examples of asymmetrical federation systems can be found from 
Russia, Spain, Italy, India and Iraq for example. At its best, the federal model strengthens 
democratic participation, the sharing of sovereignty, the principle of subsidiarity, the 
flexibility of the decision-making and the decentralization of power. Moreover, there is 
more room for the objectives of minorities to be articulated and realized.  
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Federalist structure or autonomy for the Western Sahara has been presented as one of 
the options in the peace negotiation process, but the proposition has faced resistance 
especially from the sides of the Polisario Front and Algeria. Understandably, once they 
had agreed on the referendum for independence in 1991 in the UN sponsored plan, it is 
hard to let the ultimate self-determination ideal of the national sovereignty go. The fear 
of the situation continuing as it is with a superficial stamp of autonomy can be found and 
recognized from the Sahrawi side. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of Morocco, the 
independence of the region is not even a real option. After decades of firm stances, it is 
hard to agree to compromise, because the stakes of making a compromise is constantly 
getting bigger in both sides. 
 
Ethnic and other minorities, who are unhappy with the current state of power dynamics 
in nation-states are not hard to find. One manifestation of this is dissatisfied minorities 
over the world demanding a state of their own in order to become a majority in their own 
nation-state. Consequently, many modern nation-states are being threatened with 
separation by the very same principle that sustains their claim to independent existence 
in the first place.171 The objective of the National-Cultural Autonomy (NCA) model is to 
structure democratic representation in societies that are deeply divided on ethnic 
grounds.172 The objective fits well to the analysis of the Sahrawis in and outside of the 
borders of Morocco. The NCA model is presented here as a case example of understanding 
cultural autonomy and simultaneously thinking outside of the nation-state and federal 
structure boxes. 
 
The original National-Cultural Autonomy model was already introduced in 1899 by 
Renner’s article titled ‘State and Nation’ as an alternative to protracted intrastate ethnic 
conflicts. The objective of the model was to contain secessionism with the constitutionally 
guaranteed collective rights, wide cultural autonomy and cultural self-determination for 
the national and ethnic minorities of a country. The basis of the model is based on the 
‘personality principle’. The idea that communities are organized as sovereign 
collectivities no matter of their actual location in the multinational state (or outside of it). 
The structure is labelled as ‘personality principle’ because it refers to the widest personal 
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choice of its members of belonging to the community. It is compared with the ‘territorial 
principle’ of a nation-state with a limited geographical territory: “(T)he personality 
principle… would separate the question of governance from the issue of protecting 
national and cultural identities, just as religious freedom separated church from the 
state.”173  
 
Simply put, cultural autonomy is what many cultural or ethnic minorities all over the 
world dream of, but what the central governments of many countries are not willing to 
give to them. To name a few, we can find examples from the Saami people in Scandinavia, 
from the Inuit’s in Canada or from the San people of Southern Africa. Even though the 
Sahrawi people are demanding more than barely cultural autonomy, NCA might provide 
a model which would be acceptable to Morocco and sufficient to the divided nation to 
sustain their culture and the still partly existing nomadic way of life of the Sahrawi people. 
Many of the Sahrawis’ demands of today concern their socio-economic rights, equal 
opportunities for education and descent level of income. The most challenging political 
stalemate originates from the requirement of the Sahrawis political representatives, the 
Polisario Front’s, demand for the self-determination process of the nation via referendum.  
 
Based on the NCA model, all citizens would declare their nationality when they have 
reached the age of adulthood and gain socio-political rights, such as the right to vote 
consequently. The members of the national communities, regardless of their physical 
territorial location, would form a public association which would have sovereignty over 
all national-cultural affairs. Nimni points out the fact that the “national territorial 
boundaries always create minorities and propensities for ethnic discrimination”.174 The 
principle of equal representation via individual equality175 threatens the equally 
important need for the recognition of diversity.  
 
The acceptance of diversity and multiculturalism is still lacking from many today’s 
modern liberal democracies. The NCA model provides an example of a non-secessionist 
political structure for cultural autonomy, which is based on the individuals will to belong, 
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on the democracy of the ruling method, on an equal distribution of resources and on the 
basis that ethnic and national communities can be organized as autonomous units in 
multinational states.176 It is one prominent example on how multinational states could 
remain their existence without being divided into many smaller countries.177 
 
3.5. Sahrawi Nationalism and Distant Nation-Building 
 
Due to the fact that the Sahrawi people are living as a divided nation, the formulation of a 
coherent nationalistic identity would intuitively seem to be close to impossible. Most of 
the Sahrawis live in the refugee camps of Algeria, while some have been subjected to the 
policy of morocanization in Western Sahara and a small population, mainly following the 
nomadic lifestyle in the desert, lives in the other side of the wall. The policy of Moroccans 
moving to Western Sahara has shifted the ethnic composition of the territory in the favor 
of Morocco, marginalizing the Sahrawi to become a minority in their previously owned 
land. The processes of moroccanization is suppressing the Sahrawi culture in the area 
governed by Morocco, which includes the banning of a Sahrawi dialect Hassaniya and any 
display of Sahrawi culture and symbols, encouraging the usage of Moroccan dialect Darija 
in the institutions and education.178 This shift in the ethnic mix does not encourage 
Sahrawis to move back from the Algerian refugee camps, where the temporarily intended 
status of a refugee has become the norm.179  
 
As the political leaders of the Sahrawi Arabic Democratic Republic, the Polisario Front 
need to build its nation-state mostly from a distance. The geographical area which the 
Republic strives to control is situated far from the state institutions in exile, which are 
governed from the refugee settlements of Tinduf in Algeria. The headquarters of the 
theoretical country are physically situated almost 50 kilometers south from the Algeria’s 
military base Tindouf, in a small town called Rabouni.180 The distance from Tindouf to the 
capital of Western Sahara, to Laayoune (نويعل Al-ʿAyyūn), is approximately 500 kilometers. 
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In  order to describe the peculiar status of the Sahrawi nation and distant nation-building 
led by Polisario regarding ‘their own’ Sahrawi nation, the term distant nation-building will 
be used. Distant nation-building refers to nation-building in both the strategic and 
normative sense, which is manifested from a geographical distance via political local 
activism, telephone and face-to-face communication, traditional state media and social 
media. 
 
Since the 1,559 kilometer-long borderline between Morocco and Algeria has been closed 
since 1994, physical access to the region from Tindouf to the region of Western Sahara is 
not possible by foot. Even without the challenges to cross the borderline from Morocco to 
Algeria, the many minefields alongside the Berm wall keep anyone out who Morocco is 
not willing to welcome to the Moroccan terrain. Among the most secure defensive walls 
worldwide, the berm consists of almost 10-foot-high walls, electric fences, barbed wire 
and soldiers surrounded by what is believed to be the world’s longest continuous 
minefield.181 Landmines and other explosive remnants of war have not only endangered 
the lives of local populations and their livestock, but also posed additional threats to the 
UN military and international personnel, 182 who are monitoring the ceasefire and 
providing logistical support to the area.183 It is safe to conclude, that there is no such thing 
as free movement from or to the region of Western Sahara. 
 
With the referendum on independence stumbling on to the definition of who is considered 
to be ‘a Sahrawi’, the national identity label has been a subject to vast political contention. 
In Arabic, the term origins from the word ‘sahra’, which refers to an inhabitant of the 
desert. The politicization of the term emerged at the end of the Spanish presence in the 
region and was mobilized and monopolized by the Polisario Front in the 1970s. Polisario 
used the label as a political unifier for the many tribes moving around the region. This 
tribal identification being the basis for the eligibility to vote in the referendum makes the 
definition politically and legally important.184 Within the complexities of descent, regional 
boundaries and ethnicities, the most generally understood, pragmatic definition of 
                                                 
181 Swenson 2014. 
182 In February 2008, a mine action program was established called the MACC (Mine Action Coordination 
Center) inside of the MINURSO to support the mandate in ceasefire monitoring with reducing the threat of 
mines and other explosives devices. 
183 UNMAS 2018. 
184 Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011, p. 8. 
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Sahrawis is that they are: “the Hassaniyyah-speaking peoples who claim membership 
among at least one of the social groupings found in and around the area now known as 
Western Sahara.”185 
 
One of the most distinctive features of the Sahrawis is the nomadic way of living. Nomads 
live in different locations, moving from one place to another when the water resources 
and food for the animals run out. The Berm and the division of the Western Sahara into 
two has erupted the possibilities of the free movement of people, endangering their 
traditional nomadic way of life. The compaction to one village or center of habitation in 
the refugee camps does not fit for all. There is a tendency of the Sahrawi people moving 
away from the administrative core of the camps to enforce their independence and 
privacy from Polisario and other institutional structures, such as the international 
agencies.186 
 
Without having direct physical access to the region, media and other communication 
channels gain special importance. The Sahara Press Service was established in 1999 “to 
publicize the facts and developments on the question of Western Sahara”. The content in 
the internet can be read today in five different languages: Arabic, Spanish, French, English 
and Russian.187 The language variations demonstrate the fact that the Sahrawi news are 
not only meant for the ‘citizens’ of the SADR, but for the international community as well. 
In addition to the official Press Service, the Saharawi Journalists and Writers Union [UPES] 
has its own page, where the content is currently only available in Arabic.188 On Facebook, 
the non-official site of the ‘Sahrawi Democratic Republic’ page has 18,759 likes. The site 
seems, once again, to be targeted first of all at the international supporters of the 
independence movement, as most of the posts are in English with a few sentences in 
Spanish, French and Arabic every now and then. The official state television channel RASD 
TV uses Spanish and Arabic in their website, which refers to the fact of being made for the 
Sahrawi by the Sahrawi.189  
 
                                                 
185 Zunes & Mundy 2010, p. 93. 
186 Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011, p. 28. 
187 Sahara Press Service 2018. 
188 UPES 2018. 
189 RASD TV 2018. 
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The information war is tangible between the conflicting parties, as with every site the 
SADR or Polisario produces, there is a Moroccan alternative. For example the “Polisario 
Confidental” website, which works in English, French and Spanish, is described to have 
the objective ‘to provide information on the Cold War between Algeria and the Kingdom 
of Morocco, in a context where alliances are disrupted and balances are reversed around 
energy interests (Algerian side) and political interests (Moroccan side).’ Contrary to its 
name, the site is clearly promoting the Moroccan side of understanding, even though the 
side is allegedly run by a Sahrawi journalist living in Spain. 190 After reading just few 
headlines on the various websites it is possible to have a good guess, what are the real 
interests behind providing the information – or at least, what is their stand in the 
information war.  
 
Even though the amount of face-to-face interactions with the Sahrawis living in different 
parts of Algeria, Mauritania and Western Sahara is far from habitual, families have been 
able to stay in contact to some degree with the help of the UN. During the war many 
families were divided, as some families escaped to Algeria while others stayed on the 
Moroccan governed side. The UNHCR has created a confidence-building measures 
programme191 in the region in order to facilitate communication between the Saharawi 
refugees in the camps and their families in the Western Sahara territory. Family visits and 
cultural seminars have been the two main components of the plan. The amount of families 
in the program is vast: between 2004 and 2012 the total amount of people registered was 
48,252.192 Between 2004 and 2014, over 20,000 individuals benefited from the program 
through flights and ferries to the Western Sahara and back. Disagreement between the 
parties stopped the program in 2014, and the family visits are yet to resume.193  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
190 Polisario Confidental 2018. 
191 The UNHCR Confidence Building Measures program in Western Sahara began already in 1998. It was 
originally a part of the UN Settlement Plan with the aim to support the planned voluntary repatriation of refugees 
from the Tindouf camps to take part in the referendum. However, due to the political and practical disagreements 
about the program between Polisario and Morocco, the activities began only after 2003. (Jacobsen 2017, 9.) 
192 UNSC Report 2013. 
193 Jacobsen 2017, p. 10. 
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4. Research Questions, Material and Methodology 
The interplay between the research questions, the research material and the methodology 
of the analysis is in the focus of this chapter. First of all, the research questions formulated 
on top of the theoretical basis are developed. Second, the research material to which these 
questions will aim to provide answers to is shortly introduced. After the description of the 
research material, the methodology of a narrative analysis in the scope of the research 
will be examined. Finally, one sub-chapter is devoted to the limitations and ethical 
considerations of the research, as they are a crucial part of every research process. In the 
field of Peace and Conflict Research, this piece of work can be seen to represent a voice-
giving research, because it gives space to the views of the Sahrawis, which are not heard 
in the mainstream media or policy analyses. It highlights something crucially local and 
cultural, which is political (and strongly politicized) due to the stagnated nature of the 
unresolved conflict.  
 
From the basis of the theoretical framework, it is possible to state that Sahrawi 
nationalism and the feeling of a shared Sahrawi identity is one of the core fuels on the 
journey of the nation towards the independence of Western Sahara. The stagnated 
situation evokes a lot of questions to be answered. One of them is that what is the relation 
of Sahrawi nationalism to the promises of the long-waited self-determination. Has the 
waiting, the patience, become one of the features of the story of the nation? Even though 
the state-driven nationalisation process through national narratives strives to be 
comprehensive and to be adopted by all the citizens of the nation, it rarely is. Thus, are 
there any competing narratives of the Sahrawis current story or the future of it inside of 
the movement? Nonetheless if there is, it is another story is it visible in the narrations the 
Sahrawis present and tell to the external audience. 
 
Moreover, a nation-building process often concerns a region, where the officials and the 
leadership of the nation have full access to. However, that is not the case of the divided 
nation of Sahrawis, partly habited in Western Sahara and partly in the refugee camps of 
Algeria. How distant nation-building is built and enforced in the Western Sahara region, 
which is dominantly governed by Morocco? From these interesting question marks, the 
following research questions are formulated: 1) What kind of narrative lines can be 
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identified in the story of the Sahrawi nation directed to the outside audience? and 2) How 
the prerequisites for state-building and the nation-building of the SADR is described in the 
nationalistic narratives of the Sahrawis? 
 
With posing these and other questions, we must be self-aware of the fact that we approach 
the conflict from the outside and therefore can have only very limited knowledge of it. 
Answers to these research questions would surely vary if the region of the Western 
Sahara would enjoy the freedom of speech and press, or if there would be possibility to 
interview personally people living in the region of Western Sahara. With the current 
circumstances we have no other choice but to rely on content that is already ‘out there’ 
and pose these research questions in relation to the material at hand. The limitations of 
the research and the research choices made are discussed in the end of the chapter, after 
introducing the research material and narrative analysis as the methodological approach 
of the thesis. 
 
4.1. Research Material   
 
The research material is collected from publicly available documents and other materials 
(mostly through the internet) that have been released or published after the year 2000. 
The timeframe has been selected from two reasons: to narrow down the big amount of 
data and to formulate one possible understanding of the current elements in the Sahrawi 
nationalism and nation-building processes. Via the trend of globalization and 
technological improvements, the nation-building processes of nations have gotten new 
tools to function. The social media applications from Whatsapp to Facebook are one of the 
many manifestations of this change, which are in great importance for the Sahrawis in 
order to keep in touch with family members and friends on the other side of the Berm. 
Furthermore, 2000 is the year when the UN negotiator James Baker introduced the first 
Baker Plan, suggesting that Western Sahara should be accepted as a semi-autonomous 
part of Morocco. Even though the proposition did not change drastically the path of peace 
negotiations at the time, it was the first time in the process when referendum of the self-
determination of the region was not presented as the sole possible way out of the dispute.  
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The research material is categorized with numbers from one to eleven. The first interview 
is found from the webpages of the African Democratic Institute and is conducted in 2017. 
Under the headline of #YourOpinionMatters, a 45-years old journalist and a human rights 
defender, Malainin Lakhal was interviewed. In a ten questions long interview he was 
asked about issues such as the living circumstances in the Western Sahara, the 
international power dynamics in the region and the future of the Sahrawi nation. The 
interviewer was not named, but it seems that the website of the African Democratic 
Institute is a strong supporter of the independence cause of Western Sahara.194 The 
second interview dates back to the year 2012 and was conducted by a journalist, 
Bhakti Shringarpure, in New York in March, around the Fifty-sixth Commission on the 
Status of Women held at the headquarters of the United Nations. Shringarpure 
interviewed Fatma El-Mehdi, the Secretary General of the Sahrawi National Union of 
Women concerning the status of the conflict, the history of the conflict and the rights of 
women in the Sahrawi society. The interview can be found from the pages of a news web 
site maintained by the Arab Studies Institute and called as the “Jadaliyya Web 
Magazine.”195 
 
The third interviewee represents the older generation of the Sahrawis. A Sahrawi 
grandmother called Mbareka is interviewed by Russell Fraser in an interview published 
on the webpage of the UN organization UNCHCR in the 14th of June 2018.196 The fourth, 
very short interview is found from the webpages of the human rights organization 
Amnesty international, where a famous Sahrawi activist Aminatou Haidar appeals for 
attention to the Western Sahara conflict after 14 days of hunger strike, protesting her 
expulsion from Laayoune in Western Sahara by the Moroccan authorities.197 The fifth 
interview in order is from the year 2001, when Michael Bhatia managed to have a long 
interview with a Polisario Front commander, Brahim Bedileh. The interview is the one of 
the few interviews found which achieves the standards of a research interview from the 
                                                 
194 The Western Sahara conflict is described in the website under a headline of “The last Colony of Africa” with 
the following terms: “The West often portrays itself as the champion of democracy, rule of law and human 
rights. Yet, when we look at Western Sahara, the hypocrisy and dishonesty in such portrayals are laid bare. The 
story of Western Sahara – the plight of its people and their struggle for freedom – is willingly and deliberately 
ignored by Western powers and mainstream international media despite the fact that it is the last colony standing 
in the African continent.” African Democratic Institute, 2017 
195 M2, Shringarpure 2012. 
196 M3, Fraser 2018. 
197 M4, Amnesty 2009. 
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perspective of the social sciences field and brings therefore important viewpoint also to 
the more “official” Polisario representatives views on the conflict situation.198 
 
The sixth interview is conducted by Nina Nedrebo in December 2010 in the Sahrawi 
refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria. Nedrebo had recorded the oral history of five Sahrawi 
woman, who are called Dajna, Aza, Asisa, Dmaha and Fatimatu. The carefully conducted 
and formulated interviews provide womens views on their childhood in the Western 
Sahara, the Sahrawi culture and customs in the camps and the role of the woman in the 
society.199 In addition to interviews already in a written form, also video documentaries 
where used in order to have even wider material basis for the research. First selected 
documentary is made by Silvia Luzi and Luca Bellino and it is published in 2015. A 
documentary called “We are Rebels. Western Sahara.” has subtitles in English, but the 
original languages in the interviews used are Hassanyaa and English. The documentary is 
26 minutes long and in there the Sahrawi male activists voice is stronger than the females, 
as only few women are interviewed.200 Another video form material, which is found and 
chosen from the platform called the Youtube, is the Vice News produced story line with 
the title “The Sahara’s Forgotten War” from the year 2014. The report from the conflict 
situation is 36 minutes and 41 seconds long and the languages used are French, Hassaniya 
and Spanish. The report is a versatile description of the current situation and gives space 
for Sahrawis both in the camps and in the “occupied” territories of Western Sahara.201  
 
The third video form material was produced by Dancing Turtle Films in 2012 and is called 
“La Badil - Western Sahara documentary”. The fifteen minutes long documentary 
interviews local Sahrawis, who live in the Moroccan controlled side of the Western Sahara. 
The background of the documentary is described with the following terms: “La Badil (No 
Other Choice), was filmed undercover in the Moroccan occupied territories of Western 
Sahara, on the eve of the second anniversary of the 2010 uprisings at Gdeim Izik.”202 
Fourth and last video form material used is a short documentary called the “Voices of 
                                                 
198 M5, Bhatia 2001. 
199 M6, Nedrebo 2010. 
200 M7, Luzi & Bellino 2015. 
201 M8, Vice News 2014. Under the video a background of the reporting is described with the following terms: 
“VICE News travels to Western Sahara's occupied and liberated territories, as well as the Polisario-run refugee 
camps in Algeria, to find out more about one of the world's least reported conflicts.” 
202 M9, Dancing Turtle Films 2012. 
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Western-Sahara” from 2016. The short documentary, filmed by Kristoffer Klunk, is only 2 
minutes and 26 seconds long and can be found from Vimeo video service.203  
 
In order to get a better grasp of the situation and having power over the questions in the 
interview situation, one face to face interview was conducted in Helsinki, Finland on the 
5th of February 2019. I sat down with Menna Lehbib, the Polisario representative in 
Finland in the Polisario Front information office and discussed about Polisario as a 
political movement, about the living circumstances in the refugee camps and about the 
cultural features of the Sahrawi people. We discussed in English around one hour and she 
was happy to answer to all my questions, which where fifteen together, starting from her 
personal background and ending up to the future of the Sahrawi nation. I was welcomed 
to visit the refugee camps myself, which I will do when I have time and financial resources 
to do so. 
 
As can be concluded from the introduction of the material used, the linguistic basis of the 
material is versatile: Hassanya, English, French and Spanish are all used. However, due to 
my language skills scope having only English and French in use from these four languages, 
a big part of possible material was excluded from the possible reach. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to claim that with this restriction the material is best suited for the scope of the 
research’s interest – which is the narrations visible to the outsiders of the Sahrawi 
community. That is the material, which is directed to the external audience of the 
international decision-makers, politicians, activists and researchers.  
 
The ways of communication with the internal and external audience vary with languages, 
tools, objectives and means. One hypothesis, which is difficult to prove, is that the Sahrawi 
national narrative appears more coherent and structured to the external audience, than 
it is in the everyday communications between the Polisario Front leaders and its Sahrawi 
                                                 
203 The text under the video describes the situation: “40 years have passed since Morocco occupied the territory 
of Western Sahara, and 23 years since the war ended. The young generation of today has never seen the war, but 
never experienced a free homeland either. They have ideas and dreams. they have traveled abroad to get an 
education, and return hoping to be resources for their community. In the camps, however, there are no jobs 
waiting and they fill their days with different activities irrelevant to their education. In this movie we tell the 
story of some of the young people living in the camps, waiting for a political solution of the conflict.” Klunk 
2016. 
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citizens. Like already stated before, as outsiders of the Sahrawi community, we have 
access only to the content, which is meant to be seen and made visible.  
 
Furthermore, we would get a different view of the Sahrawi identity and nationalism if we 
would hear and listen only to the views of internationally oriented and well-educated 
individuals, who have a strong role in the Sahrawi society as part of the Polisario 
leadership elite, in comparison to the people following nomadic lifestyle or people 
working as shop keepers or taxi drivers in the camps. To acquire wider scope of the views 
on the Sahrawi nationalism and local and distant nation-building processes, interviews 
from different socio-economic classes was chosen. By giving voice to people from multiple 
positions it is easier to evaluate whether there are some internal conflicts inside of 
Sahrawi society – or more accurately, are the political conflicts of society visible to the 
external audience. Moreover, the material is gathered from the genders recognized in the 
cultural context of North Africa, both female and male Sahrawi. Approximately half of the 
interviews are from women and half from men, but the potential differences of the two 
genders is out of the scopes of this research. 
 
4.2. Narrative Analysis 
 
Narrative analysis as a methodological choice lays its foundation on the understanding of 
constructivism as the ontological basis of the social world. Through speech and writing, 
we make our thinking tangible to the reality outside of ourselves and by doing that, 
simultaneously construct and negotiate the nature of reality – both our own and the 
shared one. As social animals, we have the need to belong to a larger social unit like 
community or society, which in part explains people’s constant effort to negotiate shared 
meanings and formulate coherent stories with the people surrounding them. People wish 
to be seen, heard and understood. In order to understand their own lives and what 
happens around them in the world, actions and events get a meaning via positioning them 
in a bigger narrative.204 
 
                                                 
204 Czarniawska 2004, p. 5. 
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People plan and justify what they are doing partly in their minds through thoughts, but 
rather mostly with wording those thoughts in conversations with other people.205 
Explaining actions and reasons of existence happens throughout spoken narratives. In the 
begin of our lives we are mainly subjects of the stories of our family members and close 
ones, but with growing grows also our own voice to represent ourselves. Narratives are 
profoundly political, because these representations of ourselves and others shape the 
social reality and what is considered to be possible in it.206 
 
The origins of narrative analysis can be traced down to literacy theory, ethnography and 
psychoanalysis, but the method is nowadays used by researchers from diverse 
disciplinary backgrounds such as sociology, history and organization management. The 
combining element of these fields is relying on narratives as a method of research through 
acknowledging the importance of the interaction of people, who make sense of the 
complicities of the world through story-telling and narratives. Connections with 
constructivist turn of social sciences can be drawn, due to the interest to address 
narratives as constructions of meanings and accepting the fact that there exists multiple 
perspectives and understandings of reality. Moreover, the belief that the visibility of the 
most relevant, ’most popular’ truths are grounded in social relations and are manifested 
through people’s interaction is a prerequisite for the use of narrative analysis as the 
method of research.207 
 
As we are unlikely to ever be able to grasp ‘the truth’ objectively, we must settle for 
examining the truths, in plural – the ways people see, experience and describe the reality: 
what is true to them. We have to make sense of the events that we partake in, to give them 
structure and to: “organize human experience into meaningful episodes.”208 The ways 
these descriptions are made is through spoken and written words that portrays the 
thinking and feeling in a way understandable to people on the same basis of culture, and 
in some degrees beyond that, shared by members of humankind. I define here narratives 
as structured manifestations of the experienced reality with story form, which are produced 
individually but shared collectively.  The relationship between language and culture goes 
                                                 
205Czarniawska 2004, p. 4. 
206 Wibben 2010, p. 43. 
207 Slembrouck 2015, pp. 239 – 240. 
208 Wibben 2010, p. 43. 
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into two ways: language can be thought of as not only a manifestation but also a product 
of the culture.209 The story form of the definition refers to the logic of the narration: 
Narratives are usually logical and well-rehearsed.210 The attractiveness of a story, a 
narrative, does not depend on whether it is true or not, but is always negotiated 
situationally.211 
 
There are multiple possible ways to use narrative analysis. The most suited for the aims 
of this research is to use thematic analysis, where language is viewed as a resource that 
offers access to meanings, not as a topic of investigation in itself. In the thematic analysis 
the emphasis is on the content of a text, rather on “‘what’ is said more than ‘how’ it is 
said”.212 In the examinations of nationality and nation-building, narratives are seen as a 
part of a larger narration (or narrations), which are spoken out by individuals of the 
collective, but aim to represent the shared story of the nation. Even something shared is 
first manifested through an individual. Bigger narratives, so called ‘grand narratives’ 
restrict which kind of understanding and meaning is reasonable and rational and which 
is not.213 The story of the nation is a grand narrative, where uniformity of description is 
desired and conflicting information or evidence is likely to be regarded as irrelevant. 
 
In the analysis the focus will be on the elements that many Sahrawis share and express 
concerning the nature of Sahrawi nationalism, in part via the individual experiences of 
individuals and in part through the organization they are representing. In order to 
understand society, it is essential to discover its most important stories and understand 
the history behind these stories - especially the ones related to identity-formation of the 
given society.214 This is important to note as narratives are not arbitrary but are instead 
always historically effected and directed and continually framed by traditions and various 
other contextual factors. In the example of national narrative, it is often constructed with 
a combination of historical main events, dominant cultural elements and stereotypes of 
personality traits of a representative of the nationality. 
 
                                                 
209 Minami 2015, p. 76. 
210 Czarniawska 2004, p. 52. 
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Looking into narratives is a way to examine different perspectives on the social reality, 
which is, the only reality that people share. Shared social reality is limited by the human 
psychology of the maximum number of people you can meet and remember during your 
life, by cultural norms and understandings, by the size of the local community you are 
interacting with and the personal experiences and viewpoints, which have all great impact 
on how effectively you can practice social interaction and examine critical evaluation 
towards it. Even though social reality is the closest that we can get to a shared one, it is 
different depending on the time and place in the history of humankind. Narratives rarely 
describe or even aim to describe the present. The retrospective dimension is at the core 
of what narrative is, as narratives always contain looking to the past from the present 
moment.215 However, narratives do not represent the past world objectively or describe 
necessarily how the events were experienced then but are in constant contact with 
present and the expectations of the future.216 What fits to the story, is told. What does not 
fit or support it, is in all silence left out. 
 
4.3. Considerations and Limitations  
 
In this section, the most apparent ethical considerations and limitations are presented. 
Most of them connect with my personal relation with the region, which is simultaneously 
both a possibility and a threat. That being said, the possibility to examine these threats 
and risks might help to avoid the fall to the most obvious holes in the research ground, 
which are the lack of objectivity and on the other hand, ignorance towards the real 
dynamics in the region in research scope. Another part of the limitations gets their basis 
from the lingual limitations and the geographical distance which I had to find solutions to. 
Before starting the study, I had more beliefs than knowledge about the Western Sahara 
region and the conflict. One of them was the ignorance towards the fact that the Sahrawis 
do not speak French as their second language like Moroccans do, but Spanish. Without the 
knowhow of Spanish and with only limited knowledge of Arabic, the research material 
used has been either translated in English or French or conducted with using these two 
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languages. It is apparent that the usage of mostly translated texts and interviews as 
research material creates the possibility of small misunderstandings due to the potential 
of errors in the translation. In order to avoid this setback, I have practiced a great deal of 
source criticism while choosing the analyzed material. 
 
As was shared in the introduction, two of my personal motivations to do this study on the 
Western Sahara conflict are both voice-hearing and voice-giving. From the beginning of 
July to the end of December in 2017, I worked in the Embassy of Finland in Morocco in 
the capital of the country, in Rabat. After living in Morocco for six months and being 
constantly subjected to the one-sided information of the conflict, my interest began to 
grow to see the other side of the coin. However, if even some diplomats, let alone activists, 
human rights observers and researchers, were not allowed to enter to Western Sahara, it 
was clear that I had no possibility whatsoever to go there as a western researcher, 
working in the Embassy of Finland. After finishing my thesis, I wish to be able to see the 
reality of Western Sahara and the refugee camps in Tindouf with my own eyes. 
 
One potential deficit of the research is my lack of experience from the actual conflict area 
of Western Sahara and the other is my warm relation to the country and its people of 
Morocco. Nevertheless, my aim for objectivity and distance from the viewpoint of 
Morocco can be proven by the simple fact that the viewpoint of Morocco is not from what 
I am per se interested in in the scope of this research; the objective is not to repeat 
something, which is already very well presented in politics and in people’s minds. Both 
the obstacles of not being able to conduct research interviews in Western Sahara and the 
imbalance of my time as a researcher used in Morocco are situational limitations that 
must be taken into consideration. The first one of the two is more concerning, but can 
hopefully be forgiven due to the limitations regarding Moroccan law, the power of 
Morocco in relation to its Embassies in Rabat, financial and time resources and safety of 
the researcher. 
 
Scrutinizing characteristics of a party in a conflict from cultural and geographical distance 
has many challenges and questions to be addressed. First of all, it is impossible to know 
how identity and nationality are experienced and felt in the hearts and minds of the 
Sahrawi people - would be arrogant and misguided to suggest otherwise. More culturally 
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informed and comprehensive study on the identity, nationalism and nation-building of 
the Sahrawis would require being able to live in the region and make interviews both in 
the refugee camps and in the Western Sahara region. The non-ideal conditions for making 
this kind of research from the distance are recognized. That being said, the longitude of 
the conflict and the prolonged refugee situation of the Sahrawis in the camps of Algeria 
give significance and justification to the efforts to capture some of the perspectives 
influencing to the conflict also from the distance. The aim of the research is to grow 
understanding and awareness of the conflict from the framework that we have in our 
hands. 
 
In addition to the geographical distance and in link with it, there are few limitations in the 
scope of the data as already suggested. First, the language barriers with the Sahrawi 
dialect ‘hassanya’ naturally limited the amount of the material, which directed the framing 
of the research questions. Unlike the Moroccan dialect ‘darija’ with mostly the mix of 
Arabic and French, ‘hassanya’ has considerably more influence from Spanish. Due to the 
close links of the Sahrawis with the Spanish solidarity networks and NGO’s, Spanish 
language skills would have been in the end more useful than French has proven to be, as 
many Sahrawis speak Spanish as their native or second language. However, the variety of 
translated content to English and French made it possible not to limit the estrade of voice-
giving only to the most educated elite and the Polisario Front international 
representatives, who have wider language repertoire. Furthermore, the usage of readily 
translated material makes the research much depended on the accuracy of the 
translations. However, in the documentaries and interviews used, there is no reason to 
suspect the purpose of the interviewers and documentary makers to be anything else but 
to present truthfully the aspirations of the Sahrawi interviewed. Simultaneously, we have 
to acknowledge that every interview, every documentary and every conversation has 
certain way of understanding and framing the world and the conflict in question: no one 
is capable to full objectivity. 
 
To conclude the limitations and ethical considerations of the research, it is needed to point 
out that the setting shares some questionable features with research made from issues 
“somewhere out there” without having the practical knowledge and cultural 
understanding basis to fully understand the issue, which should be constantly self-
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reflected. Nevertheless, the narratives presented to the external audience is in the focus 
here – not the self-understanding or internal communication and narrations of the 
Sahrawi. To the outsiders from our closest circles, we tell a continuous story, with careful 
consideration to what to say and what to leave to the hands of silence. Through 
interviews, documentaries and speeches the layers of the nation and nationalism are 
colored and strengthened, for narration tellers themselves and for us, to the external 
audience. As the struggle of international recognition is a crucial part in the aim of self-
determination for the Sahrawi, the narration of the nation matters. How the nation is 
pictured, how it is seen and heard and do the international community think it has 
legitimacy to survive as a nation, are the questions that will, in the end being the ones that 
will determine the fate of the Sahrawi nation. 
 
5. Research Findings: Analysis and Discussion 
 
There are many ways of reading and analyzing a text. The effort in this piece of work is 
oriented to understand, not to explain what meanings the text and words hold in 
themselves. We do not have the power nor the knowledge to explain what the 
interviewees meant and thoughted while being interviewed. Only the individuals 
producing narration have the power to explain what they meant, us in the outside 
observing that action have only the possibility to interpret. Moreover, it is worth pointing 
out that narratives are never fully complete, but also conflicting, incomplete and 
fragmented. In the search of narrative lines, we are balancing in a thin robe: on the other 
hand, between simplifying the narration and from another, making the narration an 
understandable totality. To make justice to the original narratives lies in the responsibility 
of the researcher, which has been the objective in classifying the data.217 Furthermore, 
speaking and writing are two different modes of discourse.218 The analyzed material has 
been originally in the form of a speech, but transferred to text through subtitles. Through 
written form meanings achieve longer life than the event of the speech act.219 
                                                 
217 Czarniawska 2004, p. 62. 
218 Ibid, p. 69. 
219 Czarniawska 2004, p. 69. 
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In the first section of this chapter, the analysis process will be scrutinized to make the 
different stages of the research followable. After that the focus is turned towards the 
clearest narrations risen from the material, which are analyzed one by one. The research 
can be seen to represent theory-bound research220, where the analysis of the material is 
not directly based to the theoretical framework, but the theoretical understanding of the 
operated concepts and the framework are supporting the conclusions of the research.  
 
First stage of the analysis was to take a closer look to the themes and forms of the chosen 
texts and documentaries. Even though the styles of the narrations varied to some degree, 
they were most structured in the same way than a traditional interview: a journalist 
would ask a question and the interviewee would answer. Only one of the used texts had 
significantly more space for description and narrative forms of telling. The ’Memories of 
Western Sahara’ documentation by Nina Nedrebo (2010) reminded more of an 
ethnographical research setting than a short interview for a journal or an online 
magazine. In the other written interviews, the questions that the interviewer posed for 
the interviewee where visible. Contrary to the written from, in the documentaries the 
answers where to a large part cut out, remaining faithful to the genre of documentaries, 
but leaving the viewer without the context of the wordings of the questions. The 
possibility to estimate the questions attitude and the effects of the wording to the answers 
is outside of the material’s usage. Regardless of the lack of information what comes to the 
formulations of the questions, the documentaries offer usable material by widening the 
scope of material from written to also video form of documentation. 
 
After scrutinizing the differences in the form of the material, the next step of the process 
was to organize the data thematically under two research questions. Some additional 
words were added under both research questions to give more direction to the sorting 
out of the material. The supporting words for the first research question looked like this: 
                                                 
220 Research in social sciences can be divided between theory-driven, theory-bound and data-driven research. 
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-> story of the nation, Sahrawi nationalism and national identity, the most 
repeated/strongest features      
 
With sorting out the material, which were at this point named with numbers, each of the 
pieces where coded with the color of the two research questions one by one and then 
divided into different documents based on the different color coding and the theme of the 
paragraph. At this point, the material was divided into three groups: in addition to the two 
questions, the information concerning the self-determination process was separated from 
the rest of the material. 
 
After all the material was thematically divided, the next step was to turn towards the 
larger narrations rising from the material. However, it is important to point out at this 
point that the classification between the two research questions was not easy or simple, 
as many of the elements in the narrations could have been under either one of the two 
questions. Nevertheless, for the first research question, four main narrative lines where 
found and named with defining features of each main message. The natural and personal 
national characteristics where described both explicitly with different adjectives and 
implicitly between the lines. Description, which was clearly strengthening the positive 
self-understanding of the Sahrawis was named with the headline: “We, the good Sahrawis: 
determinant and forgiving”. Beside the cultural stereotypes about the nature of the people, 
traditions, habits and the way of life form another important domain of the story. These 
cultural feature descriptions where named as the “Unique Sahrawi culture – nomadic 
lifestyle and tea ceremonies”. With a strong history with traumatic war experiences, 
Sahrawis understand themselves a lot through the painful memories of exile, fight and 
defeat. The third identified part of the story of the nation describes that dynamic with the 
title “Life of struggles, suffering and war”.  
 
As a rather small nation spread untraditionally inside of different countries, to the 
“occupied” land of Western Sahara and in the Algerian deserts, there is a specifically 
strong sense of solidarity found among the Sahrawis – at least it seems like that to the 
external audiences. This fateful yet appealing unity among the Sahrawis is described from 
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different actors’ mouths in the fourth element of the narration called “Our destiny, history 
and future”. Here the larger historical framework of the nation is introduced and mixed 
with elements of fatalism and possible martyrdom the future might bring - fighting until 
to death or until total freedom of the nation. 
 
The thematization with the second questions was done in a similar way than with the first 
research question: first some support words under the question where labeled, second 
the material was gone through with identifying the themes in the text with color codes. 
The support words for the thematic analysis where: 
-> nation-building, distance to the homeland, communications with people in the WS region, 
the importance of media, life in the WS    
 
Even though many Sahrawis have been born and raised in the refugee camps close to 
Tindouf in Algeria, vivid descriptions from the beautiful and rich coast line are repeated 
in the oral stories of the elder, who still remember the time of fight and flight. Tales about 
the promised homeland, which was once theirs is introduced under the title of “The sea, 
the breeze and the oppression of the homeland”. In addition to the distant nation-building 
dreams, another interesting feature of the nation is the division of it: How are families 
able to keep in contact with each other when there are hundreds of kilometers and a 
massive wall dividing them? Even though the modern social media channels provide 
many possibilities to keep contact, the desert is not the most well-connected geographical 
area to keep connections to other Sahrawis or even to the “outside world.” The second 
main storyline describes the interpersonal relations of the Sahrawis and the political 
objection working in secret. The subchapter is named to be “Our communication exceeds 
their walls”.  
 
One, very interesting and significantly defining feature of the political representation of 
the Sahrawis is the gender equality in the camps. The strong representation of females in 
the local and international community is rare in the region of North Africa, in the linguistic 
basis of Arabic and the religious rules of Islam. Features describing the institutions, 
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political systems and the democratic representation of the Sahrawis is examined in the 
third subchapter called the “State of freedom, democracy and strong women”. Altogether, 
there are seven different major narratives analyzed, four inside of the first and three in 
relation to the second research question. The final subchapter of the analysis part 
concludes the different elements of the narrations and answers to the two research 
questions introduced before.  
 
5.1. Narratives on Nationalism 
 
We all have a life story, as individuals and as nations. Our stories provide us (close to) 
coherent answers to questions, such as “where do we come from?” and “where are we 
going?”. Questions concerning nations can get quite fundamental, such as “what our way 
of living is?”, “what are our common values?” and “who belongs to ‘us’?”. The stories of 
nations are always connected with the stories of other nations: if there would be only one 
nation, there would be no real or imagined national special characteristics, as all of us 
would be seen to belong to the same big group of human beings.221 In a life story of both 
individuals and nations, there is a beginning: in the life of an individual it is a shorter 
process of birth than in more abstract story of the nation. However, what differentiates 
the life story of an individual from the story of the nation more drastically, is that the 
nation does not have a foreseeable end. In between of the members of a nation, it is a 
shared hope that the nation prospers and does not end – idealistically ever. Part of the 
charm in nations is that the story goes on, long after our individual stories come to an end. 
 
The imagined, uncoherent story of the nation provides a fruitful basis for many kinds of 
viewpoints of exploring, but our interest in the framework of this research is first and 
foremost in the self-understanding of the nation by the members themselves of the 
Sahrawi nation. As outsiders of the Sahrawi community, it would be challenging to get a 
grasp on what is the story told inside of the nation, but possible to scrutinize what is told 
to the outside of it, to the outsiders of the community. However, one of the suppositions 
                                                 
221 See e.g. Anderson 1991. 
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of the research is that the story told inside of the nation and to the outside of it do not 
drastically differ from one another. Anything else would be both bipolar and hard to keep 
together. In the sections that follow, each of the most dominant storylines on Sahrawi 
nationalism risen from the material are analyzed one by one. 
 
5.1.1. We, the Good Sahrawis: Determinant and Forgiving  
 
Like stated before, an essential part of every nationalistic story is the imagined 
uniqueness of us: us Americans, us Finns or us Sahrawis. There are national 
characteristics that are reconstructed by the way we behave and explain our behavior in 
the way we best see fit, offering the most flattering or suitable explanation for the given 
cultural or spatial context. National stereotypes are simplifications that we can either 
consciously or unconsciously enforce or try to resist. However, our own attitude towards 
them do not make them disappear. Stereotypes have often a negative side included in 
them, which makes them, in a sense, more balanced with positive and negative elements 
than the stories that we tell ourselves about our nation. How we describe our fellow 
citizens and our nation give visible clues concerning on how we see ourselves and how 
we wish to be seen in front of the eyes of the others. 
 
Not surprisingly, the narrative line about the special characteristics of the Sahrawis is 
composed from many positive adjectives. Determination and persistence of the nation is 
one of the themes, which is often mentioned both implicitly and explicitly in the 
narrations of the interviews. Persistence and determination seem to connect both to the 
harsh living circumstances in the Algerian desert as well as to the continuity of the fight 
regardless of the voice of the Sahrawis being heard by only a few in the international 
community’s arenas.  Moreover, the independence of the Sahrawi nation in Western 
Sahara is seen as the ultimate outcome in the end, which is destined to prevail sooner or 
later, because the Sahrawi people “are not giving up fighting”.222 The strength of the 
                                                 
222 M1, Malainin Lakhal in African Democratic Institute 2017: “Now, in our case I am sure we will gain our 
independence because my people are not giving up fighting. They are decided to take back their future from the 
usurpers of our land.” 
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determination of the Sahrawis is described to be comparable to a gun, as a weapon that 
simply cannot be destroyed. It is an immaterial resource, which stays alive across 
individual’s life span and is stronger than the fear of losing individual’s own life. Speaking 
of the dangers in being part of the resistance movement in the time of the beginning of the 
war, Commander of Polisario in the Tifariti region, Brahim Bedileh, describes the 
immortality of the Sahrawi determination with the following terms:  
“Before the Palestinians were bombed in Lebanon, we were bombed here. Despite the danger, the 
Sahrawis continued their determination. This did not kill their determination, the tanks, the mortars, 
the satellites with photo capacities, the weapons supplied by the US, France, Italy, Belgium, the UK, 
Israel, Germany…”223 
 
The message can be read to be simply: “Our determination is stronger than the enemy’s 
guns”. Furthermore, the Commander Bedileh makes another comparison to the tools of 
war: “We have not increased our soldiers, nor have we bought new material. The main 
weapon we have is our determination and willingness.”224 Implications to determination is 
done also by speaking of how the Sahrawis have already decided their future with a clear 
choice for freedom.225 As if, regardless of whether the actors outside of the community 
accept it or not, the choice for the future is already made. Some interviewees describe how 
nothing can stop the determination of an individual Sahrawi fighting for her country, and 
how the fight will continue until death, if necessary. Rabab Deid, the Mayor of the Lemsid 
district of the refugee settlements, describes the situation with the following terms: “We 
are here due to a national question, the liberation of our land, and we will continue on the 
same path, even if we end up in a common grave. We are awaiting here our 
independence.”226 Malainin Lakhal, a Sahrawi human rights activist and journalist repeats 
the same message with different words by saying how the Sahrawis cherish freedom and 
independence in the same way all free Africans do. If the price for the freedom is death, 
so be it.227 Behind the strong words there can be found some connotations to fatalism and 
even clear martyrdom, when the sacrifices of the individual lives loose importance 
                                                 
223 M5, Brahim Bedileh in Bhatia 2001. 
224 Ibid. 
225 M1, Malainin Lakhal in African Democratic Institute 2017: “It is a message from our people to the so-called 
international community that we, the Saharawis, already have decided our future, and we are ready to confirm 
it in a self-determination referendum if we are allowed to. Otherwise, our choice is clear. We want to be free! 
There is no other alternative to our freedom.” 
226 M8, Rabab Deid in Vice News 2014. 
227 M1, Malainin Lakhal in African Democratic Institute 2017: “Because we are free Africans, we have always 
cherished freedom and independence, and we will die free if that’s the price we have to pay for the freedom and 
the dignity of all Africans.”  
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compared to the goal of an ultimately independent land for the Sahrawi nation. The 
rhetoric used is strong, powerful and demanding. 
 
According to the narrations on national characteristics, the Sahrawis have other virtues 
in addition to their determination and persistence. Described features of tolerance and 
forgiveness present softer tones of the characteristics than the narrations of martyrdom 
and ‘walking the path of freedom until the end’. The Polisario Commander Brahim Bedileh 
makes comparisons between the provocation tactics of the Moroccans to the Sahrawi way 
of respecting the rules of the international law: 
“All of these years, we have avoided all kind of activities that do not comply with the 
international law...(W)e wait for a legal solution, because we are pacific and responsible 
government. We always respect the rules dictated by the UN and international organizations. 
We never opted for the ways of terrorism or something like that, in spite of quite a lot of 
provocations by the enemy. We have been bombed by napalm, including the city centres of 
the Sahrawis. And yet, we always have been fighting in legal terms.”228  
According to the narration, regardless of the experienced injustices, the Sahrawis have 
not only fought with legal terms, but further, been very tolerant and forgiving. The 
Sahrawis have awaited patiently and given the peace process support still after many 
failures from the side of other conflicting parties and the international community 
representatives, such as the UN.229 Further on, the Commander Bedileh describes the 
Sahrawi nation to be a unified one, fighting together for a legitimate cause of liberation.230  
 
However, the patience of the Sahrawis is described in contradictory terms. As if the 
patience of the Sahrawis is an apparent common resource of the whole nation, which, 
nevertheless, has the potential to run out in any possible given moment. For example, in 
one section of the interview with the Commander Bedileh the patience of the nation is 
told to last until the time of the war231, in another it is implied that the patience of the 
                                                 
228 M5, Brahim Bedileh in Bhatia 2001. 
229 M5, Brahim Bedileh in Bhatia 2001: “We were happy when Baker was selected as the intermediary of this 
conflict, in spite of previous US support for Morocco. We forgot the past. Our people have a lot of tolerance. We 
forgot the problems of the past.” 
230 M5, Brahim Bedileh in Bhatia 2001: “First, all the Sahrawis are fighting for their legitimate and unified 
cause. We are volunteers, all Sahrawis are volunteers. We are not here for a professional purpose, but for the 
fight for liberation.”   
231 M5, Brahim Bedileh in Bhatia 2001: “But we have patience, and until the time we have to return to war, we 
will be patient.”   
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Sahrawis can stop in any given minute and explode, causing a full violent war by itself.232 
There seems to be a following dynamic in the narrative: We do have patience, but because 
of the exploitation of our patience without any results, the resource of patience is soon 
running out. This could, and maybe should, cause the making of the following statement: 
the Sahrawis are patient in waiting – but for how long?  It seems that this kind of dynamic 
is apparent especially in the more militaristic sides of the Polisario movement, which is 
not that surprising: in the end, it is the job of the military fractions of the society to keep 
the soldiers ready to defend their region or to attack to the terrain of the “enemy”, 
depending on how the political situation of the society evolves. 
 
Nonetheless, in most of the outcomings of the interviews, there cannot be found this kind 
of inner tension in the message. Some of the statements can be positioned closer to a 
verbal threat of having enough, with the moment of escalation to violence being close. A 
Sahrawi activist, Lanzari Mohamed Salem is clearer in his personal views about the 
situation:  
“In my opinion, too much pressure will cause an outburst of anger. I’m repressing my anger, but 
sooner or later others will not do the same. Nine out of ten of us are ready to sacrifice our lives to 
save one… How long will the internet be enough to express my feelings and my nostalgia? There 
will come a day when human bombs will explode. When we’ll arrive at some point, when we’ll have 
enough...I’ll be one of the first to break the wall, at least I’m speaking for myself.”233 
 
A Sahrawi war veteran, Ahmed Sale, shows his frustration to the situation also very 
directly: “We’re close to war. We can’t control ourselves anymore. The UN hasn’t brought 
any solutions. 23 years for a referendum they planned to organize within six months.”234 
 
To conclude, there are multiple repeated elements in the story of the stereotypical 
Sahrawi character, such as clear determination, strong willpower and persistence to both 
to the provocation of the “enemy” and to the uncertainty of the prolonged conflict 
situation. Moreover, the Sahrawi nation seems to have a high respect for the rule of law 
                                                 
232 M5, Brahim Bedileh in Bhatia 2001: “In this time, we are standing-by, but we have begun to lose our 
patience. I have no words to convince these soldiers for this kind of waiting, the soldiers insist daily to do 
something. They will solve the problem peacefully or they will go to the front, and one day they can get out of 
control, and attack behind the berm into Morocco.” 
233 M7, Lanzari Mohamed Salem in Luzi & Bellino 2015. 
234 M8, Ahmed Sale in Vice News, 2014. 
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and the international institutions like the United Nations, at least based on the self-
understanding of the nation in the research material. These characteristics form an 
outline for the shared understanding of who are the good Sahrawis like and how the 
national special characteristics of the Sahrawis are explained and recreated to the 
outsiders of the community. 
 
5.1.2. Unique Sahrawi Culture – Nomadic Lifestyle and Tea Ceremonies  
 
Regardless of the cultural diversity among the Sahrawis, there are some aspects in the 
Sahrawi culture that can be named as important and uniting in the nationalistic story. In 
the Master’s thesis of Silje Rivelsrud, where she examines the manifestations of the 
national identity of the Sahrawis in online blogs written by two female Sahrawis, 
Rivelsrud found three most frequently used cultural symbols and traditions among the 
Sahrawis to be: 1) traditional female headgear called Mehlfa, which changes both in style 
and in colors 2) the famous Sahrawi tea ceremony and  last, the 3) Sahrawi Arabic dialect 
of Hassaniyyah spoken in the region.235 In order not to underestimate nor repeat the 
message of Rivelsrud’s piece of work, the focus in here will be in the analysis of the 
elements risen from the interview material of this research, which differ slightly from the 
work of Rivelsrud. 
 
The clearly strongest cultural feature in the examined narratives is the nomadic way of life 
of the Sahrawis. The nomadic way of life is described to mean a harmonious connection 
with the nature and the environment, the freedom of movement and the varying cycles of 
moving from one place to another. The Berm dividing the Sahrawi areas and the 
governmental structure of organizing the society in the refugee camps has made the 
nomadic way of life more difficult, but the remembering of the continuous “on move life” 
seems to be considered important part of the Sahrawi identity. A Sahrawi woman called 
Aza, who lives in the refugee settlements, tells that before the governmental organization 
                                                 
235 Rivelsrud 2010, p. 52. 
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of the Sahrawis, the society was based on a tribal system, where each tribe had their own 
representative.236 
 
The historical framework of the Sahrawi community can be divided into three phases of 
nomadic, colonial and exile living. Despite many changes in the living circumstances of the 
Sahrawi people, most cultural features of the society have been able to remain as the 
same. The strong role of women in the society has been formulated already in the first 
stage of the nomadic lifestyle: “(T)he first stage is the nomadic period of time, where 
women played an important support role in the places they lived. People moved 
depending on the rain, and it was a difficult life, where they were relying on the animals 
for what they needed.”237 Moving happened with the rules of weather and resources 
guiding the way, staying few months in one place and then moving on, closer or further 
depending on the humidity of the season.238 Even though the movement from one place 
to another has lost its status as the preferred lifestyle for the majority of the Sahrawis, the 
living conditions do not vary that much; in the open desert or in the camps, most Sahrawis 
live in tents. A Sahrawi grandmother, who was exiled from Western Sahara in an early age 
and who currently lives in the Smara refugee camp, Mbareka, describes the significance 
and the humble way of life in the tents: “We do everything in here: sleep, eat, drink tea, 
receive guests. They are part of our culture. If you offered an old person here a villa or a 
tent, we will choose the tent.”239 
 
However, the Sahrawis have managed to build also some more permanent apartments for 
living over the years, as the community has stayed in the same settlements for so long. 
The nomadic way of life is today closer to a myth of a lifestyle than the everyday reality 
for most of the Sahrawis. The Polisario Information Office representative in Finland, 
Menna Lehbib, has been born in the refugee camps of Algeria and has lived in Spain, 
Norway and Finland after Algeria. She describes the living conditions in the camps with 
                                                 
236 M6, Aza in Nedrebo 2010. 
237 M6, Daina in Nedrebo 2010. 
238 M6, Aza in Nedrebo 2010: “If it was a good season for rain, we moved, but we would not move far. We 
might have stayed two or three months in one place, and then we moved again, but not a long distance. Yet, if 
we were in a dry season, we could move very far.”   
239 M3, Mbareka in Fraser 2018. 
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the following terms: “We lived in tents without any houses where I was born. Now there 
are some small houses made by the Sahrawis themselves, but overall there are no good 
life conditions there.”240 She points out, that everything is made by hands in the camps, as 
there is no proper water circulation or electricity networks and continues: 
“We are refugees, living without any basic conditions for living on the edge of the 
world. Our consume of water for a family is for one year what it is for a Finn per 
day (40 l). I heard it from the YLE selkouutiset, that is what they say the Finns 
consume. We need to protect our environment and the water. In here, you have a 
machine to clean your clothes and a machine to clean the house, you can imagine 
that what it is when we do everything by hands. We hope that one day we get these 
kinds of machines to help our everyday life.”241 
 
Regardless of the though living circumstances, the social life of the Sahrawis seems to be 
rich in nature. Many social events are combined in the importance of the Sahrawi tea 
ceremonies. Like Lehbib puts it: “We are very social, if you want to go to drink tea, you can 
go in any time you want.”242 What is needed for a tea ceremony according to the 
traditional Sahrawi customs is “charcoal, people, and time.”243 The triangle of three 
remains also in the more modern saying that the tea is “sweet, strong, and soft”, depending 
of the order in which the cups of tea is drank.244 Tea brings the people of the Sahrawi 
community together and provides a framework for discussions from everyday issues to 
the storytelling of history: “Tea is considered everything. Saharawis can sit, relax, talk, 
transmit history, tradition, and changing events. It’s the ‘key’ to the idea of exchanging 
experiences”, Asisa explains.245 The oral history of the Sahrawis, social problems of any 
kind and events of celebration are all transferred from one to another in front of a cup of 
tea.246  
 
                                                 
240 M11, Menna Lehbib 2019. 
241 Ibid. 
242 Ibid. 
243 M6, Embarka in Nedrebo 2010. 
244 M6, Zorgan in Nedrebo 2010. 
245 M6, Asisa in Nedrebo 2010. 
246 M6, Fatimatu in Nedrebo 2010: “(T)he ceremony of tea was a very important moment to transmit history, 
religion, to find a person who can teach children about history for Saharawi people. They talked about the rain, 
about places they could search for animals, and who was going to win traditional plays for youth. Games, 
marriage, social problems or issues were topics.” 
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However, what is left without saying, is the importance of tea among different ethnic 
groups around the Sahrawis, such as among the Moroccans; Morocco is famous of its mint 
tea culture. Overall, versatile tea culture is famous in the whole region of North Africa, but 
the traditions and customs around the cultural traditions vary from region to region. It is 
possible to conclude, that the tea culture is closer to something regional than specific only 
to the Sahrawi community. What ever is the case, the tea ceremony meaning in the 
Sahrawi culture seems to be undebatable.  
 
5.1.3. Life of Struggles, Suffering and War  
 
In the narratives of a determinant, free and righteous Sahrawi nation who enjoy the 
possibilities of nomadic lifestyle and a cup of tea with the members of the community, 
there is also parallel narrative lines of strong struggles, suffering and war. The struggle of 
the Sahrawi people is frequently compared to the struggles of other countries and nations, 
who have been undergoing the process of anticolonization in Africa, countries such as 
South Africa.247 Support for the Sahrawi cause is tried to achieve through appealing to 
fellow Africans in the continent and declaring the battle for freedom to be for the sake of 
the whole Africa, like journalist Malainin Lakhal is doing:   
“Now, I want all Africans to understand well that we are fighting on their behalf, because the 
fight for freedom and self-determination in Western Sahara is not the exclusive duty of 
the Saharawi’s alone. No, it is, and it must be the fight of all freedom lovers in the continent 
and abroad.”248 
 
Reasons for the instability in the region is searched from the powerplay of Morocco and 
its ally France, who the Sahrawis are fighting against to protect the common good and 
freedom for all in the African continent and beyond.249 Fatma El-Mehdi, the Secretary 
                                                 
247 M1, Malainin Lakhal in African Democratic Institute 2017: “Like South Africans once suffered under 
Apartheid, we are still suffering in the occupied zones of Western Sahara from arbitrary detentions, peaceful 
demonstration are banned and if organized violently oppressed, we have right now around 50 political prisoners 
in Moroccan jails, many of whom were tried before Moroccan Military Courts though they are civilians and 
mostly students.” 
 
248 M1, Malainin Lakhal in African Democratic Institute 2017. 
249 M1, Malainin Lakhal in African Democratic Institute 2017: “So, I want to urge all Africans to keep an eye on 
this part of our beloved continent, because Morocco and France want to push it again into wars, chaos and 
sufferings. Yet, your brothers and sisters Saharawis will be standing against this plot, and will fight to the last 
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General of the Sahrawi National Union of Women speaks about the cycle of bitterness 
defining the sorrows of many Sahrawi generations:  
“It’s very difficult, and it’s very bitter when you know that my grandmother and my mother, 
their life was very difficult. I am now adding my story to theirs. For me, that’s a very dark 
side of our history. But my worry is not my life; my worry is the life of my children and their 
children. This gives me the strength to fight—to enable them to someday have another kind 
of life.”250 
The fight for independence is described to be a struggle of generations, where the detail 
of which generation will see the day of independence is not the most important one.251 
The mental distance from the region of Western Sahara in the camps is also described 
through generations with feelings of disappointment: “There are many generations like 
mine, born and raised in the camps and they don’t even know the city of their 
grandparents.”252 Returning to Western Sahara, when it would still be in the control of the 
Moroccan Kingdom, is seen to mean recognizing the occupation and not appreciating the 
sacrifices that the past generations, parents and grandparents of the Sahrawis living 
today, have done.253 Moreover, the Polisario Front war time commander Brahim Bedileh 
presents the struggle to have been continuing not only for generations, but even for a 
century or more:  
“France still has its old colonial culture, and they ignore the rights of the Sahrawi in this 
region, in spite of the fact that they had had previous experience with the Sahrawi people. 
They struggled with the Sahrawi people. We have a variety of martyrs and warriors, who 
fought against France in 1912…. Our struggle for freedom is not recent, but for a century or 
more.”254 
 
Furthermore, the narrative lines of the Sahrawi nation hold elements of victimhood, 
deception and suffering. The Sahrawis see themselves to be victims of not only by the 
violence of Morocco, but also the victims of the international community’s passivity and 
local and international medias. Unsurprisingly, having Morocco in control of the local 
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media in the Western Sahara region creates clear challenges of one-sided, biased 
information moving around. When asked that why she thinks that the Western Sahara 
conflict is not on people’s radar, Fatma El-Mehdi’s explanation is the following: 
“I will start by saying that we have always been victims of information, of the media. All 
of the local media is controlled by Morocco. I remember in 2001, with the support of Spanish 
women, we visited three countries: Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. We could meet a lot of 
groups, women’s groups, but nobody could talk about this visit in the media. I think the 
media is very important to create visibility. That’s what we need.”255    
 
The other deeply felt deception comes from the lost opportunities of the UN to organize 
the referendum for the self-determination of the nation, despite the many efforts and 
promises.256 In some of the interviews, especially with male Sahrawi activists, there can 
be found even radical tones of sacrifices and martyrdom in the message, like already 
stated before. Jalil Mohamed, a Sahrawi activist, who lives in the refugee camps seems to 
be ready for war: 
“As a young man, if I can’t imagine my life without freedom for 30, 40 years... Why do I have to be a 
refugee for 50 years? I’d die in a refugee camp! This is leading young people to say: war, war war! 
Because we are aware that we’d win the war. If you fight for your people, you win even if you die, 
because you’re a martyr. I’m sure there will be a conflict. This is obvious.”257  
 
It is clear that the Sahrawis in the refugee camps of Algeria and the Sahrawis in the 
Western Sahara territory live in different realities. However, it seems from some of the 
narrations that wherever there is a Sahrawi, there is some kind of suffering. At least that 
is what an activist Lanzari Mohamed Salem is making the situation to sound like: 
“What hurts me is that the Sahrawis here, in the refugee camps, also suffer from being refugees. 
They suffer the weather, which is very cold weather in the winter and very hot in summer. In the 
occupied territories they suffer the cold of the prison and the heat of the torturer’s truncheon, 
oppression and censorship. When you observe a Sahrawi you still see the suffering whether he lives 
in the refugee camps or in the occupied territories.”258 
Despite the beautiful picture painted by the Sahrawi people concerning their culture and 
the way of living, it seems that many feel to be in some kind of prison by their own lives – 
either in a role of a refugee or a fighter in other ways, waiting the justice to happen.  
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5.1.4. Our Destiny, History and Future  
 
One of the prerequisites in the self-understandings of a nation is the shared history of it. 
History provides meaning, grounding, legitimacy and a purpose for a nation, which drives 
national self-construction to constantly write and rewrite its own past.259 In the 
interviews of some Sahrawis in the material scope of this research, their common history 
is seen to begin from the occupation of Spain, in other narratives even before that. An 
important part of the historical remembering are the national celebrations, national 
symbols and the traditional, unifying festivities. In most of the countries worldwide, the 
elements mentioned above are most apparent in the independence days. For example, we 
in Finland have our own festivities every 6th of December, when the Independence Day is 
manifested from blue and white candles to a ball in the presidential palace, where the 
representatives of different domains of the country from sports, politics, army and culture 
get together to be hosted by the presidential couple.  
 
The National Independence Day of the Sahrawi Arabic Democratic Republic, the SADR, is 
celebrated in the refugee camps annually on the February 27th with parades, speeches, 
music and dance. In 2014, the prime minister of the SADR, Abdelkader Taleb Omar, stated 
that on the occasion of the Independence Day, “we should feel pride, honor and salute the 
resistance and determination of our people in the occupied territories.”260 The 
Independence Day seems to evoke a lot of contradictory feelings among the Sahrawis 
according to the interviews. On the one hand, a clear pride for the success of translating 
the political will of the Sahrawis in to a form of a constitution and the proclamation of 
independence, and on the other hand a simultaneous sadness from the reminder of not 
being free or independent after many years of political attempts to reclaim freedom.261 
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From the historical point of view of the Sahrawi community, some important events rise 
more defining than others. At least in 1975, maybe even before that, the Sahrawis started 
to reflect their existence against the Moroccans, but “the problem” of occupation started 
already with Spain. Spain was the colonizer of the Western Sahara region from 1884 until 
the year of 1975. Another important year for the Sahrawis is told to be the year 1970, 
when the Sahrawi revolution was followed by the proclamation of the Polisario Front in 
the May of 1973.262 The history of invasions from France, Portugal, Mauritania and Spain, 
in addition to Morocco, makes it easy to understand why the Sahrawi historical narrative 
is seen and explained through periods of violence. Fatma El-Mehdi sees the situation as 
the following:  
  ”In fact, when we think about our history, our past, we can only think about violence because 
we lived this violence with Spain. And even before Spain, there were other forces, like France 
and Portugal, which tried to invade us. Before Spain, there were Morocco and 
Mauritania. When we think about our past, we can only find violence, but I think it is 
precisely this condition that makes one realize that what is important is peace. But unity also 
becomes very important. I think we have very solid social values, due to which we have been 
able to survive all of this violence.”263  
The period of Spanish colonialization before the Moroccan one is referred many times as 
“the period of secrets” in the history of the Sahrawis.264 
 
The history of a nation and the remembering, representing and reconstructing of it again 
and again are all intertwined and connected to each other. As Sahrawi activist, Yahdih 
Mohamed-Fadel, puts it: “The memory is the mere existence of a people. A people must 
have a memory to exist. If there is no evidence of your existence, then you don’t exist. The 
memory is the proof that people exist that it has existed through different stages.”265 
Transmitting the history of the community to the younger generations is extremely 
important in the Sahrawi society. Mostly, the information sharing concerning the history, 
culture and tradition is done through oral stories. In addition, the significance of written 
history is acknowledged as there is a risk that some of the stories may be lost with the 
unfortunate loss of individuals of the community.266 What is typical to the national stories 
globally is repeated among the Sahrawis - even the oral history sharing of the nation is 
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done by focusing on the battles, with strong features of heroism and sacrifices while 
protecting the nation: “There is an example of a battle against France, against a colonel 
named Girard”, tells a Sahrawi woman called Embarka.267  
 
The desired self-determination process of the Sahrawis seem to be less about the 
governmental practicalities and more about having the right to decide upon the ‘destiny’ 
of the nation: “The problem is not autonomy. The key question is that the Sahrawi people 
must determine their destiny by vote, by self-determination”, explains the Polisario Front 
Commander Brahim Bedileh.268 The future of the nation is seen to be bright and 
prosperous, if only the Sahrawis would have the ownership to the lands what belongs to 
them and the political power to govern the region of Western Sahara. Malainin Lakhal 
paints a balanced and democratic picture for the future of the Sahrawi nation: 
“We want to build our State and our Nation, and we are ready to do that, because we already have 
built our own institutions, our own government that succeeded for more than 40 years to run the 
only refugee camps in the world run, administrated and organized by refugees themselves.”269  
 
Based on the data and the narrations of the research, the future of the nation is far from 
sketchy if it would be in the hands of the Sahrawis themselves. However, it is impossible 
to know how much of the desires and fantasies for the future would prevail in reality, if 
the Sahrawis ever would have the opportunity to govern themselves in the region of 
Western Sahara. 
 
5.2. Narratives on Nation-Building 
 
Nation-building is a multiphase prosses, which have to be an “inside job”. A nation or a 
state can be either strengthened or weakened from the outside, but in order to get and 
maintain real legitimacy, the leaders of a political entity must have its mandate from the 
citizens of the nation, elected via democratic process. Something else or less is not real or 
sustainable – legitimate power and authority get their strength from value-based 
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leadership, transparency and right motives to govern. One of the potential future 
challenges of the Polisario Front is how the SADR of Western Sahara is governed and the 
power maintained when there would be more than one party in the political field of the 
society. 
 
The second part of the narrative analysis focuses on the nation-building process and the 
many elements of it by the Sahrawis in the Algerian desert and beyond. Three dominant 
narrative lines found from the research material are recognized and examined. First of 
the narrative lines concerns the memories of the Western Sahara region and the hopes 
concerning “the homeland” of the Sahrawis. The next main narrative found deals with the 
communication ways between the Sahrawis in the Moroccan and the Polisario govern 
territories. The third main narrative scrutinizes the infrastructural elements, the strong 
position of the Sahrawi women in the society and the prerequisites the Sahrawis have to 
actually built a functioning state for the nation. 
 
5.2.1. The Sea, the Breeze and the Oppression of the Homeland 
 
The everyday life of the Sahrawis is described to be challenging until the day of the hoped 
return: “Every day is a challenge, and we will have this challenge until we go 
back.”270 After close to 50 years, the Sahrawis are still waiting for a political solution to 
the conflict. Most of the Sahrawi refugees were born in the camps, never having stepped 
their feet in their promised “homeland” of the long coastline. Some members of the older 
generations remember the time before the exile. A Sahrawi grandmother already 
introduced earlier in the previous part, Mbareka describes her memories in the region 
with close to poetical vibes: “I miss the air, and the earth”.271  
 
Another Sahrawi woman called Aza remembers the vast ocean and the long coastline 
dividing the land from the sea, but tells to the interviewee that it is simply impossible to 
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focus only one part of the region.272 In addition to the picturesque view of the coastline, 
the richness in natural resources is mentioned repeatedly in the interviews.  Many 
Sahrawis seem to be painfully aware of the exploitation of the natural resources by the 
Moroccan Kingdom. Malainin Lakhal describes the Western Sahara land as the following 
terms:  
“But, of course, Western Sahara is a very rich territory with all sorts of resources, 
renewable and non-renewable. This is one of the main reasons why Morocco, backed of 
course by France, refuses as you rightly said to recognize not only our independence but 
our very right to existence, to freedom and to self-determination.273  
 
Morocco seems to be seen still as a protectorate of the French colony, even though the 
decolonialization and independence of Morocco has happened already decades ago. It is 
easy to claim that the Western Sahara conflict is also about financial gain, traditional 
colonialist policies and power interests. However, while looking the conflict from the 
individual perspective of a Sahrawi, a lot more humane picture takes place. 
 
The living circumstances in the Moroccan controlled Western Sahara and in the refugee 
camps of Algeria differ significantly. However, it seems, that both of the areas have 
considerate challenges to cope with – harsh weather and dependency from a foreign aid 
in the refugee camps and harsh control and surveillance in the coast side in “the promised 
homeland”. Some go even further with differencing how the Sahrawis living in different 
regions are not even similar to each other. A Sahrawi activist, Lanzari Mohamed Salem, 
describes the differences in the following terms: 
“The Sahrawis living in the refugee camps are not like Sahrawis living in the occupied territories. 
In the refugee camps they have freedom, whereas in the occupied territories they suffer from being 
oppressed. What hurts me is that the Sahrawis here, in the refugee camps, also suffer from being 
refugees…In the occupied territories they suffer the cold of the prison and the heat of the torturer’s 
truncheon, oppression and censorship. When you observe a Sahrawi you still see the suffering 
whether he lives in the refugee camps or in the occupied territories.”274 
 
The awareness from the contractionary political situation of the Sahrawis is woken up 
from an early age. Malainin Lakhal describes his childhood in Western Sahara: “Growing 
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up in the occupied Western Sahara is like growing up in a huge open-space detention 
camp.”275 The differing treatment of different ethnic groups in the Moroccan controlled 
Western Sahara starts already from the schooling system. Lakhal talks about the 
difficulties of the Sahrawis to get higher education in the country, when he was still living 
in the region:  
“In school, we were discriminated against. It was difficult in those days for a Saharawi to finish 
school. The colonial authorities would do anything to dissuade us from progressing in our 
studies. And, reaching the university was a miracle for many of us. As kids, we were forced to 
become very politically aware since our youngest age because of this treatment, and of course we 
were also politically active, and we tended to do all in our power to make life difficult for the 
colonial authorities in the streets, especially at nights. In brief, life in the occupied zones of Western 
Sahara is the life of a colonized people struggling for their freedom and oppressed by the colonizers 
because of this struggle.”276  
 
Like in other conflict areas of the world from Israel all the way to Afghanistan, war and 
instability have an especially lasting influence on children and their development. Famous 
Sahrawi activist, Aminatou Haidar describes the unfortunate state of the children growing 
up under political oppression: 
 
"This generation and the children [in Western Sahara] witness with their own eyes the police 
oppression. Just imagine many children instead of drawing toys; they draw a policeman with a gun 
and a stick beating people and people behind bars. I am scared that they will become violent and 
incite violence: because practicing violence, one day will incite violence.”277 
 
 
Aminatou Haidar was arrested because of carrying the flag of the Sahrawi Arabic 
Democratic Republic. Later on, she has moved to Spain as a political refugee due to her 
activism.278 
 
An older man, who lives in the so-called occupied territory, confirms the socio-political 
segregation: “Life is very hard for us. The Moroccans are the only ones getting jobs.” 279 
One middle aged woman repeats the message in her own words: “We the Sahrawis don’t 
have any rights in Morocco.” 280 The memories and the remembrance of the Western 
                                                 
275 M1, Malainin Lakhal in African Democratic Institute 2017. 
276 Ibid. 
277 M4, Aminatou Haidar in Amnesty 2009.  
278 Amnesty 2009. 
279 M9, an old man in Dancing Turtle Films 2012.  
280 M9, a middle aged woman in Dancing Turtle Films 2012. 
75 
 
Sahara region provoke deep feelings among the Sahrawis. A Sahrawi woman living in the 
refugee camps, Fatimatu, describes her feelings:  
 
“It’s not easy to cope with the circumstances…Those circumstances we have considered go very 
deep, the feeling when somebody misses his or her land and others are playing with his or her 
resources…and when there is no kind of protection of the human rights, and no meaning given to 
the dignity for him or her as a normal person.” 281 
 
Like stated before, political activism of the Sahrawis is suppressed in the Moroccan 
controlled part. Hayat Rguibi, a Sahrawi activist living in the Western Sahara tells about 
her everyday life and troubles concerning societal activism:  
 
“Everything I’ve experienced this far is daily persecution. The Moroccan police was always around 
my house, tailing me to school every day and in every place I went. Even my family has suffered the 
same treatment. They arrested me…We grew up seeing the fear in the eyes of our relatives, we have 
witnessed dispersed families, a part of them in the refugee camps and the other part in the occupied 
territories. Among them there was no communication, no one knew if the others where dead or 
alive.”282 
 
Not surprisingly, many of the Sahrawi activist have been arrested and jailed. Mohamed 
Salem tells about his experiences in the local jail and the feeling after the experience: “I 
was freed and I realized that I had not been the only one to be imprisoned, but also my 
entire country was in prison. So I left a smaller prison to enter a larger one.”283 
 
The means of activism and protesting in the region have many forms: the SADR symbol 
usage, civil obedience and activism via the social media channels are few of them. Having 
a long history of being under political occupation and suppression first under Spain and 
then under the Moroccan Kingdom, the Sahrawis have become close to professionals of 
different forms of political activism. Malain Lakhal describes the history with the 
following wording:  
 
“So, during the years of the war the Sahrawi civilians’ resistance existed though it was under the 
form of secret organizations dedicated to raise awareness among people, gather support to the 
Polisario and sometimes perform some sabotage operations against Moroccan institutions and 
military and police forces. After the UN established its Mission, MINURSO, in the country, the 
Sahrawi resistance in the occupied zones opted for peaceful demonstrations and directed its 
struggle towards civil society activism defending human rights, natural resources, and social 
demands. This peaceful resistance is ongoing to this date led by an active Sahrawi civil society in 
parallel with the Sahrawi official diplomatic and political actions.”284 
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Even though the memories of oppression, fleet and the sea breeze of Western Sahara 
manifest different sides of the myth of the homeland, first and foremost the stories repeat 
the same narrative about respect, recognition and remembering. Holding simultaneously 
on from the past through oral history telling and looking to the future with full of hope the 
Sahrawi nation recreates its existence. Mbareka, who still remembers the everyday life 
before the fleet from Western Sahara has a wish before her life comes to an end: “I hope 
to go home before I die, and I fear for my daughter, my son-in-law, and for Abdullahi – that 
they will stay here and grow old. My fear is the same as everyone’s here, that we will stay 
here and be forgotten.”285 
 
5.2.2. Our Communication Exceeds their Walls   
 
In the 21st century, the communication revolution has changed the ways how we keep in 
contact and interact with our family, friends, workplace and peers. The globe has become 
smaller, there is a vast availability of different information online and the time and the 
channel of the communication sometimes grows more important than the geographical 
place of a person. At the same time, it gets more difficult to get reliable information and 
source criticism becomes one of the most crucial skills a critical individual and thinker 
can have. Depending on electricity, satellite connections and technological infrastructure, 
information and communication can travel thousands of kilometers in only nanoseconds. 
In the field of Peace and Conflict Research it means that momentums, social connections 
and the reliability of a person gain even more ground than in the old world order. 
 
However, as long as there can be found states, identities and nations in our social reality, 
there will be both borders dividing and characteristics unifying them. In the context of the 
Western Sahara conflict communication is one of the keys. The Sahrawi diaspora around 
the world is waste and active: it is not rare to go to have a university degree elsewhere 
and then return home to the camps or in the West Sahara region. In the Moroccan 
governed territory, there is no universities and no possibilities to higher education, as all 
the universities of the country are situated up in the north. Whether the lack of university 
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teaching is the south is a strategic decision, regional politics or something else, it 
diminishes the opportunities for the Sahrawis to develop their knowledge and get higher 
level of professionalism in their field – the less educated people are, the easier it is for 
Morocco to govern and rule them. 
 
Like stated before, the Moroccan and the Polisario Front controlled parts of the West 
Sahara are divided by a wall. Around 2 700 kilometers long wall divides the territory in 
to two different parts, without “no access from the inside to the outside or vice versa”.286 
The Berm is surrounded by one of the largest landmine fields in the world, being strongly 
inspired by Israel. From the top of the Berm, the Moroccan military groups hold 
surveillance over the Polisario Front governed area. Fatma El-Mehdi thinks that the 
landmine field is weapon directed especially to the most vulnerable parties of the Sahrawi 
community, such as children and the animals:  
 
“It is basically a kind of weapon against the nomadic Bedouin people, especially women and 
children. If they ignore the landmines, the children start to play with them, and there have been a 
lot of victims. Also, it becomes impossible to get water from the land, since it’s dangerous. People 
have also lost their animals. The nomads’ animals cannot be controlled, so they end up dying.”287 
 
Due to the restrictions for the freedom of the movement in the area, the significance of 
traditional and social media grows. Convicted activist in the field of media, Ahmed Badi 
Mohamed Sale, believes the media channels to support finding out the truth from the 
conflict from the perspective of the Sahrawis:  
 
“Any means that give us the opportunity to claim our rights, it’s our right. Although Sahrawi 
activists are not media professionals, they can spread the truth through the new communication 
tools, even if Morocco tries to hide everything. They are ordinary citizens spreading the reality 
despite the difficulties. This is part of our daily activities. We consider it as a struggle. It can be 
means of persuasion, but also a weapon to hurt the enemies, because it uncovers the truth about 
the enemy, the Moroccans. How do you hurt the enemy? By revealing the truth! We’ll achieve our 
goal, only by so doing.”288 
 
Like it often is the case in conflicts, enmities and oppositions are being reproduced and 
rebuilt by strong language usage, for example speaking about “the enemies” and “the 
truth.” On the other hand, it is very understandable that signs of frustration and anger are 
repeatedly expressed, due to the power asymmetry in the conflict. When it comes to the 
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resources, power, and the international supporters, the Polisario Front has the lower 
hand in the international arenas. Nevertheless, it was Morocco who was out from the 
continental body of Africa, from the African Union for so long, not the Sahrawi Arabic 
Democratic Republic. This regional political detail proves that the Polisario Front and the 
independence efforts of the Sahrawis have at least a lot of support in somewhere else than 
the hegemonic west and the previous colonial authorities of France and Spain. 
 
The status quo of the conflict has remained stagnated for so long that the Sahrawis are 
continuously developing and improving their strategies for their pacifist battles. Lanzari 
Mohamed Salem, a Sahrawi activist describes going through and around the wall with the 
help of carefully planned communication:  
 
“The wall…We can break the wall through the communication strategies. I’m part of the group 
‘Cries against the wall’ that protest against the wall, revealing its true nature and the worst of its 
images to the world. It’s a shame that this wall still exists in the 3rd millennium. The wall has divided 
the land into two parts, but it couldn’t divide the Sahrawi people. The people remained united 
mainly thanks to the internet.”289 
 
The family relations between the Sahrawis living in the refugee camps, in the Moroccan 
controlled area and in other Spanish or Arabic speaking countries worldwide face similar 
challenges than people in other conflict areas and situations of exile are faced with; the 
distance between the people and the ways of dealing with the distance. The United 
Nations has organized visits between the camps and the “occupied territory” to unify 
family members, but only a part of the Sahrawis have been able to benefit from the 
program.290 
 
Many political activists underline the strong solidarity feeling between the Sahrawis 
worldwide; if your existence as a nation is under a threat, it seems to unite people like 
nothing else. The communication mechanisms and contact keeping to the loved ones are 
found from the letters of the last century and from the WhatsApp messages of today. 
However, social media can never truly replace face to face human interaction, and the 
frustration of some of the Sahrawis activists seems to grow also regarding this matter. 
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Lanzari Mohamed Salem points out, that the internet will not be forever enough to express 
his feelings of caring and nostalgia. 291 
 
The feeling of victimhood seems to be strong among the Sahrawis, not least because of the 
lack of international interest and media coverage. How Fatma El-Mehdi puts it is:  
 
“I will start by saying that we have always been victims of information, of the media. All of the local 
media is controlled by Morocco. I remember in 2001, with the support of Spanish women, we 
visited three countries: Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. We could meet a lot of groups, women’s groups, 
but nobody could talk about this in the media. I think the media is very important to create visibility. 
That’s what we need.”292 
 
 
Media activism is practiced in the Western Sahara region, in the Algerian desert and in 
the diasporas worldwide. Another Sahrawi media activist, Ahmed Ettanji, tells about the 
structure of the activism practiced:  
 
“The ‘Media Team’ is made up of Sahrawi activists. We are aware of the power of the alternative 
media: they are ways to fight and to incite people to fight. We want to spread the real image of the 
life under occupation since we are aware of the indifference of the international community due to 
the economic affairs with Morocco.”293 
 
El-Mehdi strongly believes that the lack of interest and attention in the international 
forums is due to the lack of awareness from the conflict and the misfortunate fate of the 
Sahrawis: “I think our case is not well known yet. I think we have to create our own media, 
because we cannot count on international media. This way we will be able to travel, make 
connections, and make ourselves visible. I think that’s what we need.”294 
 
Sahrawi media activism uses the platforms of TV, radio and social media. Jalil Mohamed 
explains, that the SADR TV News is created first and foremost to defend the “historical 
values and…identity” of the Sahrawis.295 The Sahrawi Arabic Democratic Republic is the 
only Arab (wannabe) country, whose nation speaks Spanish because of the Spanish 
colonial history. According to Mohamed, that strong cultural and historical feature is “a 
key factor to be defended”, because the Spanish colonization is part of the historical 
heritage of the country. Mohamed continues, that even though the Sahrawis are not proud 
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to have been colonized, they are proud to speak Spanish as their second language.296 
Communication channels are seen as an important part of the info war:  
 
“Publishing is the new war and we are at war. All the Sahrawi people know that the media are 
essential. Can we say that we are at war? Yes we can. Do we have fewer communication tools? Yes, 
actually we have fewer tools. But we have the main thing: the truth.”297 
 
A group of young activists in the Western Sahara region share the view of information 
spreading as a way to spread knowledge and their version of the events:  
 
“We are 30 young Sahrawis who strongly believe in the independence of Western Sahara. The 
Martyr magazine is absolutely prohibited in the Sahrawi occupied territories. International media 
is forbidden access to the territory to see the sufferings of Sahrawi people. There is no terrorism in 
Western Sahara. It’s the Moroccan occupiers who terrorize the Sahrawi people.”298 
 
The media activism of the Sahrawis is clearly recognized as an important part of the 
warfare. Difficulties in that are the secrecy of it – everything in the Moroccan controlled 
part of Western Sahara is done with a great risk of being jailed. However it seems that 
many Sahrawis are willing to take that risk, what ever the outcome in the end will be. A 
strong hope for the future unifies the community and gives fuel to work for the common 
objective. The Sahrawis are well aware that in order to make to the priority list of the big 
players, you have to make a lot of noise. 
 
 
5.2.3. State of Freedom, Democracy and Strong Women 
 
The strong position of women in the society of the Sahrawi Arabic Democratic Republic 
differentiates Sahrawi nation from most of the Muslim cultured countries in the Northern 
Africa area - at least according to the hegemonic nationalist narratives in the refugee 
camps. Regardless of the rather progressive views and the history of the Sahrawi nation 
with equal status in the society between men and women, there are obviously some 
differences in the believes between different generations. Cultural clashes take place 
especially when younger generation Sahrawis return to the refugee camps after studying 
years abroad with more liberalized and open cultural atmosphere. After years in the new 
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surroundings socializing back to the exceptional living circumstances in the refugee 
camps is understandably challenging. The gap between the views of older and younger 
generations, especially with people who have studied in the Western and in the Caribbean 
countries causes some tensions and conflicts inside the families.299 
 
Despite the tensions between the old and the new generations, the Sahrawis have 
succeeded well in formulating a positive image about the competences of the Sahrawi 
nation to govern themselves without strong outside influence or guidance. Even though 
the refugee camps are governed by a political party, which is simultaneously the leader of 
all the institutions of the state in exile, the system does seem democratic by nature to the 
outside audience. Fatma El-Mehdi describes the dualism of the movement with the 
following words: 
“When the Polisario Front decided to proclaim the nation-state, even while they’re still 
fighting, they also want to emphasize that this is a movement, a political movement. Now 
we have the two systems. We are a movement, but also we are a nation-state. The objective 
is to try to build and construct our nation-state while we are fighting to get 
independence.”300 
 
When asking the Polisario Front representative of Finland, Menna Lehbib, about does she 
think that the Polisario Front represents the Sahrawi society, her answer goes as the 
following: “Yes, without any word for that. Because I think that the Polisario is the sole 
movement that has the legal status in the United Nation, representing Western Sahara. 
That is the only legitimate representative of the people of Western Sahara.”301  
 
What is peculiar about the Sahrawi situation is that even though the Sahrawis are 
completely depended on foreign humanitarian aid for running their economy, they 
organize and govern the institutions of the camps by themselves. Malainin Lakhal believes 
the Sahrawi community to be more than ready to build their nation in the area the 
Sahrawis claim to belong to them:  
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“We want to build our state and our Nation, and we are ready to do that, because we already have 
built our own institutions, our own government that succeeded for more than 40 years to run the 
only refugee camps in the world run, administrated and organized by refugees themselves.” 302 
 
Furthermore, the educated and prepared Sahrawis are pictured to not only be ready to 
build their own state, but to contribute larger to the prosperity of the whole African 
continent.303 Sahrawis are aware of the political nature of their existence as a nation from 
an early age, both through education in the Sahrawi families and through the political 
oppression they face in the Western Sahara region. Lakhal describes his childhood in 
Western Sahara with the following terms: “As kids, we were forced to become very 
politically aware since our youngest age… and of course we were also politically active, and 
we tended to do all in our power to make life difficult for the colonial authorities in the 
streets, especially at nights.”304 
 
The mixture of origins among the Sahrawis, being descending from different tribes of 
North Africa has made the society quite diverse, but also inclusive in nature. The mass 
movement (or “strategic exile”) of young Sahrawis for education abroad after basic school 
levels recreates and reconstructs the cultural diversity of the Sahrawi nation. Diversity 
and inclusiveness create a useful and believable storyline in comparison to the cultural 
suffocation and moroccanization strategies of Morocco in the Western Sahara area. Fatma 
El-Mehdi describes her family situation as the following terms: 
“My family, it’s like a small planet. Some members speak Spanish, and others only Arabic, and 
others only Spanish. Some of them have Sahrawi culture, others European culture. I think 
that’s the situation of the Sahrawi society. It’s a society where all the cultures have come to be 
included. There are students who were studying in Europe or Latin America, and we have a 
lot of our students who are studying in Cuba.”305 
However, as stated before, the cultural variety in the camps has also the potential to 
provoke some clashes between the more conservative and traditional and the more 
liberal and international members of the Sahrawi community. It seems that there are both 
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conserving and modernizing forces debating about the right direction of the Sahrawi 
community in the camps, not least between the more inpatient young generation and the 
middle aged and elder, who some have seen another possible lifestyle as children, 
different to the one in the refugee camps.  
 
The young Sahrawis, who have the opportunity to do their studies abroad, assimilate to a 
new cultural framework for years. When they do come back to the refugee camps, they 
have to ‘relearn how to be a Sahrawi’. In addition to the dialectical adjustment and the 
differences with more moderate or traditional religious views with Islam, the excitement 
from the world outside and everything new has the potential to build a strong contrast to 
the harsh everyday living environment of the desert, the lack of stimulus combined with 
more traditional Sahrawi cultural values.306  
 
Even though the circumstances where the SADR is built are exceptional, it seems that the 
Sahrawis do see the Polisario Front as a legitimate government of a state without 
disagreeing voices coming to the ears of the outside audience. Like a Sahrawi activist in 
the refugee camps, Sidahmed Talmidi, puts it: “We are a democracy in here, but we are 
not in our own lands. We need our independence.”307 However, it is possible to question 
the democratic nature of the ‘state institution’: Can one-party state be democratic in 
nature, if there are no significant rivalries about the power to lead and to govern? Easy 
answer would be that clearly, it cannot. Democracy means societal pluralism, diverging 
views and debating about them, which seem not to be the case in the refugee settlements 
of the Sahrawis. Nevertheless, there are no visible signs from clear political repression in 
the camps, which means that either that kind of societal conflicts among the Sahrawis are 
well hidden or that they are so marginal in size that the common objective of 
independence easily beats other minor societal disagreements in the society. Lakhal 
believes that the Moroccan regime would not get to the same level with the Sahrawis, if 
we would to make that kind of comparison:   
 
“We have one of the most stable governments in Africa for more than 40 years so far with no single 
major political problem…(T)he Moroccan medieval regime is of course afraid of having next to it a 
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successful and democratic republic that would shed light on the Monarchy’s dictatorship and 
failure to give the Moroccans what they want: democracy, dignity and freedom.”308 
 
The last point he makes is especially intriguing, as it compares the Sahrawis and the 
Moroccans to want actually same, not different things of democracy, dignity and freedom. 
These kinds of uniting references are rare in the research material, but not nonexistent; 
the recreation of enmity towards the Moroccans is visible only in the most radical Sahrawi 
activist voices and in the rhetoric of the Commander Bedileh. From the basis of the 
research material it also seems that the female voices of the Sahrawi community are more 
constructive in their tone of voice than the more aggressive rhetoric of the Sahrawi males. 
However, this division of the different ways of narrative building and forming between 
different Sahrawi gender groups is not possible to develop further in the scope of this 
research. 
 
What has come clear already before in the analysis, is that the Sahrawi women have an 
important role in the building of the nation. Female Sahrawis seem to have more 
traditional role at home with taking care of the Sahrawi children, but also very responsible 
and visible positions in the political and organizational spheres of the society. El-Mehdi 
reveals that for a Sahrawi woman, there are two battles always ongoing; one with the 
independence efforts of the nation and another with advocating more strong female 
participation and women’s rights after the independence.309 The equal role of women 
compared to Sahrawi men is in some narrations taken more for granted than in others. 
Some Sahrawis see the equality between sexes as something very natural, but the activists 
actually working in the field of the rights of women seem to be aware of the different 
smaller connotations of the battle for equality. Many Sahrawi women see their role as 
mothers to be the teachers of the Sahrawi culture and to educate the Sahrawi children 
about their historical roots and the Sahrawi identity:  
 
“As women and mothers in Western Sahara, we are aware that we have a very difficult and 
important role; it is [to] educate our children to stick to the Sahrawi identity, Sahrawi culture and 
Sahrawi traditions. It is not an easy task and it is not a new issue. The Occupation is always trying 
to absorb the Sahrawi culture.”310 
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When a Sahrawi woman marries, she can decide herself whether she wants to stay with 
her own family or join the family-in-law. The original family of the bride buys gifts for the 
wedding: “two or three camels to sit on, to honor her, make her a ‘useful’ person, not just 
a person seeking for people to help her. They like to show that their girls are very strong 
girls who don’t have needs or are weak in the vision of others”, Daina, a Sahrawi woman 
living in the refugee camps explains.311 Fatimatu says that the lives of a Sahrawi woman 
and a Sahrawi man do not differ from each other that much:  
 
“As a woman, as a Sahrawi woman, it’s no different. This life [now] is basically the same as the past. 
We live in a nomadic society, therefore we are relying on nature, and we relied upon everything 
naturally. The position of the women is a very strong position inside the society, and it’s no different 
from the role the man played inside the society. She works very hard inside the family, inside the 
society. She tried to educate the kids, and she tried also to do the difficult work of helping the men 
for issues or for their jobs. Also we’re aware of the importance of women inside the family.312 
 
Whatever the position in the society is, common objective unites all the Sahrawis. The 
Sahrawis are very keen to prove they have the prerequisites to actually build a state for 
the nation, which they already have started in the refugee settlements of Algeria. 
Fatimatus last words in her interview are the following ones:  
 
“I consider it a principle of Sahrawis to go back in dignity and liberated. From the child, to the 
woman and to the adults… (W)e have strong hope, very strong hope, soon we will have that. As a 
Sahrawi, as Aminatou Haidar, as anybody together, we have one body, one moral, whoever is here, 
or in the occupied territory or inside Morocco, everywhere we have very strong hope. We have 
slogan that the victory is soon, that the victory is soon.”313 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The aim of the research was to examine the unique situation of the Sahrawis, who wish to 
build their own nation and state. The research puzzle had two focus directions. The first 
one was concerned with the questions of identity, foundation of the Sahrawi nationalism, 
typical Sahrawi national characteristics and the shared history of the nation. The second 
main line was focused on the memories and images about Western Sahara, the 
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communication strategies of the Sahrawis and the democratic structure pieces of the 
wish-to-be-state. These narrative headlines should not be understood as competing but 
complementing in relation to one another: the narrative lines found have all potential to 
add up to the understanding concerning the conflict situation. 
 
It is clear that an up to date research on the Western Sahara conflict is lacking. It is equally 
clear that we need to understand the mental state and self-understanding of parties in 
conflict in order to solve it. Furthermore, the original people of Western Sahara, the 
indigenous Sahrawis, are underrepresented in most international organizations, in the 
field of international politics and in the mainstream media flow, which gives a voice-giving 
and -hearing kind of research value by itself.  
 
Currently, the peace negotiation process has started (or rather continued) after six years 
pause. That is a significant step and gives hope for a better, more just future for the 
Sahrawi people in the framework of the international law. No nation should have to live 
like the Sahrawis are, depending completely on foreign aid and simultaneously fighting 
for their right to exist. What has already been given from the international community, is 
the justification, the legitimacy for a referendum and the right for a nation to determine 
their own fate. Every individual, every nation and every country should have the right for 
self-determination and self-identification. Even though we are always connected to others 
and bind by the ways others around us understand us, we should first and foremost have 
the right to understand ourselves and then name for the outside world, how we wish to 
be seen in front of the eyes of others. However, we do not live in a world of ideals.  
 
In the first part of the analysis, the outside audience directed storylines of the Sahrawi 
nation where scrutinized. Even though the elements where clear from the material of this 
research, different kind of narrative lines would surely rise from interviewing different 
Sahrawis than here have been. However, the story lines where so often repeated that clear 
classifications where possible to be drawn. On the basis of the analysis, it is hard to deny 
the charm and the appeal in the Sahrawi nationalistic storylines and to that charm the 
nation seems to put some part of their hopes in. Story of the Sahrawi nation has versatile 
elements and, in the scope of this research, it seems rather uncontradictory. The second 
part of the narrative analysis was concerned about the structural elements of the wish-
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to-be state. On the basis of the analysis there seems to be good foundation for the state to 
practice state- and nation-building in Western Sahara. However, how these conditions 
will manifest themselves when the wishes and dreams of the Sahrawi nation would 
actually come true, will be surely interesting to be followed at.  
 
All in all, even though the Sahrawis are described in the framework of the thesis as a 
nation, it has not been taken as for granted. The Sahrawis are seen as a nation simply, 
because they meet enough of the requirements for a nation to be considered as one: the 
belief of the Sahrawis that they form a nation, the common history of the people, unifying 
political institutions, a strong relationship to a specific geographical area and shared 
political objectives. It is possible to claim that before the colonization period of Spain the 
Sahrawis did not have the need to politicize their existence, as they had the possibility to 
live as moving nomadic tribes free from political institutions and governing. However, 
when the Western Sahara was handed from Spain to Morocco, real fight for independence 
started against the new colonizer. The question remains: does a nation always need the 
politicization of its existence before it can consider itself as a nation? In the field of identity 
politics and nationalism, nations are always mirrored against others, while recreating the 
division of them and us, the enemy and the fellow nationals. Following this line of thought 
it is possible to say that the colonization of Western Sahara is the event that created the 
Polisario Front and the Sahrawi nation. It is often only through shared enmity a nation is 
unified. 
 
In the future, there is still a lot of research needed in order to update the Peace and Conflict 
Research perspective on the Western Sahara conflict. Few ideas that could be developed 
further are introduced next. One interesting viewpoint for research would be that how 
the Moroccans perceive the Western Sahara conflict situation and the Sahrawis; as 
terrorists, as separatists, as Algerian puppets or as something else? Moreover, it would be 
interesting to know how well the official truth of the Moroccan Kingdom from the conflict 
is transformed to the everyday believes and opinions of the “ordinary” Moroccans, who 
do not work in the spheres of diplomacy, state relations or politics. Furthermore, it would 
be equally intriguing to research the relations Sahrawis have between Moroccans – are 
there any family fusions, links, strong networks and friendships among the political 
enmities? 
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Moreover, when (or if) the Sahrawi Arabic Democratic Republic acquires more level of 
independence and the Sahrawis get access to the many resources which belong to them 
by right, it will be interesting to see how the political system in the region will develop. 
What is now a one-party state aiming towards democracy might shift to something else 
when the state actually obtains control over the dreamed “homeland”. Will there be any 
political opposition? Will the Sahrawi youth become more radicalized and difficult to 
govern after decades on the refugee camps or will they be in a key position in the state-
building process of the fully recognized country? Only time and further research will show 
answers to these questions. 
 
In the context of narrative analysis, it would be intriguing to find out, how different 
cultural and situational factors have an effect on how the country and the nation is seen, 
recreated and experienced. For example, it seems based on the material, that there is a 
strong gender division between more peaceful and constructive female voices and 
stronger and militarist male voices. However, like previously mentioned, it is impossible 
to draw further conclusions on these possible divisions in the scope of this research. More 
emphasis on the narrations from the viewpoint of intersectional feminism and its theories 
would provide fruitful understanding to the local and cultural differences and to the 
questions of how age, gender and socio-economic position in our societies have an effect 
on how we experience and built our social understandings from our own and shared 
social worlds. 
 
What research should always be aiming to is to get slightly closer to ‘the truth’. However, 
the famous ‘truth’ of matters always takes steps further from us as we approach it. We 
will never catch it, but we can, and maybe should, always try our very best. This piece of 
work was a humble attempt to get to the bottom of what being a Sahrawi means and also, 
what it could mean in the future, if the Sahrawis ever have a real possibility to build a 
nation in Western Sahara. However, even though there is no objective truth and there 
never will be, we can find out something closer to it if we just keep our eyes, ears, minds 
and hearts open. This piece of work is dedicated to all who have a truth-seeking soul, a 
curios mind and longing for both unity and freedom. These motivations led me here and I 
am happy how the research ride was; not short, but simultaneously sweet and bitter. As 
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concluding remarks for all the nations of the world: I hope one day you will get your 
freedom, whatever that may mean. 
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<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ju4WrjiJbGc >, annexed 18.7.2018. 
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M9: Dancing Turtle Films (2012), “La Badil - Western Sahara documentary”, available: 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sekA21sVviU >, annexed 15.7.2018. 
 
M10: Klunk, Kristoffer (2016), “Voices of Western-Sahara - Short documentary”, 
available: <https://vimeo.com/160863960>, annexed 23.7.2018. 
 
Material 11: Interview with Menna Lehbib, Polisario representative in Finland of the 
Polisario Information Office, conducted on the 5th of February 2019 in Helsinki, Finland. 
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